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PREFACE 
Montana's Indians are a diverse group of more than 
10 tribes living on seven Indian reservations. Each tribe is 
different, and so is each reservation. Cultures vary. 
Economies vary. So does natural resource wealth; some 
Indians are desperately poor, others relatively rich. 
The problems facing Montana's Indians are terribly 
complex and stem from more than a century of wide-ranging 
and often damaging federal policies. Indian problems are 
compounded by confusion resulting from the clash of numerous 
governmental jurisdictions as two cultures — the whites and 
the Indians — compete for valuable land and resources, and, 
in the case of religion, people's souls. 
Many reservation Indians themselves add to their 
collective problems through political in-fighting. Some 
reservation Indians create other problems by rejecting the 
outside world. Attempting to bar all outside influences from 
reservation life may seem like a way to preserve Indian 
culture, but it can only result in the economic termination 
of a particulular tribe. Without a healthy economy, there 
can be little hope for cultural survival. 
Other problems are created far from Montana — in 
Washington, D.C., for example, where current federal Indian 
policy is formed, or in the Middle East, where a significant 
portion of the world's oil reserves hang in the balance. 
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As the world energy market changes, so too does the value of 
Montana Indians' oil, gas, and coal. 
Montana's Indians are also inextricably tied to 
their state, and vice versa. The current statewide recession 
in agriculture and resource industries has hurt everyone, 
regardless of race. Indians play a vital role in determining 
the fate of almost 10 percent of Montana's geography. They 
own a variety of resources and play increasingly important 
roles in local and regional economies. Yet, unfortunately, 
relations between Indian governments and state or county 
governments remains poor. 
Graduate research presented in this paper looks at a 
variety of these problems and how Montana's Indians are 
dealing with them in these changing times. Three issues — 
political self-determination (self-rule), economic develop­
ment, and natural resource management — are examined as 
they come together on Montana's seven reservations. 
Throughout this paper, economic development is defined as 
sustainable growth, the sort of which will prevent 
exploitation of the land or its people. Further, the concept 
of economic development must be broad enough to include 
human development, because economic development without 
human development is exploitation. 
The paper is divided into two parts, plus an 
introduction and a conclusion. The introduction provides an 
overview of the current economic and political situation 
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found on reservations in Montana. Part One takes a closer 
look at eastern Montana's six reservations with a chapter on 
each. Part Two is devoted entirely to the Flathead Indian 
Reservation in western Montana. 
The Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the 
Flathead Reservation have been singled out for a number of 
reasons, the most important being that they have put 
together the best reservation economy in the state, and are 
perhaps the closest to reaching the goal of self-rule. It is 
hoped that other reservations might look to the Salish and 
Kootenai as a possible model for success. 
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INTRODUCTION 
AN OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS 
ON MONTANA'S SEVEN INDIAN RESERVATIONS 
Common Problems and Trends 
Found in Indian Governments Today 
Montana is Indian country, and if Indian leaders 
like Kenneth Ryan have anything to say about their future, 
it will remain Indian country. 
"We've been starved, we've been cheated, we've been 
given disease — but we're not going to go away," says Ryan, 
chairman of the oil-rich Assiniboine and Sioux tribes of 
northeastern Montana's Fort Peck Reservation.^ 
Ryan and tribal leaders across the Big Sky like to 
talk in terms of persistence, adaptability, and survival. It 
is significant, they say, that Montana's 49,000 Indians 
continue to exist a century after having lost most of their 
land to whites, and after living under federal policies they 
say have been designed to destroy rather than build. 
Their vision of the future demands economic self-
sufficiency, a tremendous task given that the federal 
government annually spends $2.5 billion nationwide on this 
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country's 1.5 million Native Americans.2 And their vision 
includes the survival of cultures steeped in traditional 
ties to the land, spiritualism, respect for elders, and a 
sense of community. 
Goals of self sufficiency are, however, proving to 
be allusive throughout what's known as Indian country. While 
some reservations in the United States are further developed 
than others, Montana tribes generally remain as they have 
for more than a century: dependent, to varying degrees, upon 
the federal government for the essential requirements of 
life: food, shelter, and health care. Statistics from the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs and tribal governments show social 
and economic pain unmatched elsewhere in Montana.^ High 
student drop-out rates, widespread unemployment, poverty, 
alcoholism and related diseases — these and other social 
barometers all indicate that Native Americans are among the 
most disadvantaged minorities in Montana, and America.'* 
Bureau of Indian Affairs statistics from 1985 report 
unemployment figures ranging from 27 percent on the Flathead 
Indian Reservation to 78 percent on the Fort Belknap Indian 
Reservation.^ The BIA reported unemployment on three other 
reservations — Rocky Boy's, Crow, and Northern Cheyenne — 
at greater than 60 percent, while Fort Peck Reservation 
unemployment was listed as 40 percent and Blackfeet 
Reservation unemployment at 36 percent.® 
But tribal leaders say BIA figures are too 
optimistic. Government statistics do not take into account 
the large number of Indians who, out of despair, have 
dropped out of the workforce altogether, or who for other 
reasons are never counted, tribal leaders contend. They also 
say economic conditions have worsened since 1985. 
For example, the Blackfeet tribal government reports 
actual unemployment on its reservation at 60 percent, while 
Crow and Rocky Boy's tribal governments each report 85 
percent unemployment.^ 
Poverty statistics are similar to those for 
unemployment. The federal government reports that the number 
of Indians living in poverty on Montana's reservations 
ranges betwen 35 percent and 50 percent, yet tribal leaders 
acknowledge much higher statistics.® Crow tribal chairman 
Richard Real Bird says that more than 95 percent of all 
Indian homes on his reservation receive some form of 
Q 
welfare.' 
For comparison, unemployment nationwide for all 
races is about 7 percent, while the nationwide poverty rate 
for all races is about 14 percent.*® 
Reservation economies have been plagued by federal 
budget cuts and falling tribal revenues from natural 
resources such as coal, oil, gas, and timber. Sagging 
agricultural markets have also hurt the reservations, as 
they have the entire state of Montana. Meanwhile, economic 
conditions are expected to get worse before they improve, as 
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the state-wide recession continues. 
Donald "Louis" Clayborn, the state of Montana's 
Indian affairs coordinator, says that some tribal 
governments have made economic and political gains in recent 
years, but most will continue to find it nearly impossible 
to find enough capital to spur economic develop­
ment.** 
Indians are concerned about federal budget cuts. 
According to Clayborn, federal policies under the Reagan 
administration have been "tantamount to economic 
termination" of the reservations. 
National budget figures for the two largest Indian 
agencies (BIA and Indian Health Service) show that their 
combined spending levels of about $1.6 billion are nearly 
the same in 1987 as they were in 1979, the last year of 
Jimmy Carter's presidency.*2 However, double-digit inflation 
in the early 1980s and an inflation rate of about 4 percent 
since 1984 have taken their toll on Indian appropriations.*^ 
While money earmarked for Indians under these two programs 
has been held at a constant, total annual federal spending 
has nearly doubled over the same period — from about $530 
billion in 1979 to an estimated $1 trillion in 1987.*4 
Indians have felt the budget axe in other federal 
agencies, according to Jane Clairmont, the tribal grants and 
contracting officer for the Confederated Salish and Kootenai 
Tribes.*^ The departments of Housing and Urban Development, 
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Commerce, and Education once provided a variety of programs 
specific for Indians, she says, but they have since 
eliminated or sharply reduced Indian programs. 
One way Clairmont can measure the impact of federal 
budget cuts is to examine how they have affected the federal 
government's primary self-determination policy on a 
particular reservation. Public law 93-638, the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 
established what's widely referred to as "638" contracting. 
Under this law, Indian tribes contract with the federal 
government to assume the management of services previously 
provided by the federal government. Money comes from the 
federal government, but the programs are managed by Indian 
governments. 
Clairmont oversees the fiscal management for a host 
of such programs —among them law enforcement, social 
services, education, resource management — now contracted 
by the Salish and Kootenai tribal government. In 1981, 
tribal government received $16 million for such contracts; 
in 1987, the federal government reduced these expenditures 
to $10 million.*® 
The Salish and Kootenai, with the best Indian 
economy in the state, has found other sources of income to 
supplement some of these programs. But the Flathead tribes 
are an exception rather than a rule. 
"Most tribes aren't in a position like we are," she 
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says, adding, "Most tribes don't have a thing. What are they 
going to do? They are going to be terminated." 
In theory, state government is to replace the 
federal government -- to help fund social welfare and 
educational programs, for example. But the state cannot, due 
to its own limited funds and because of a quagmire of 
jurisdictional problems. 
It's not easy for the white society to understand 
the Indians' problems. But to start with, Montana's Native 
Americans ask that the larger society first recognize how 
things have become as they are. Fort Belknap tribal leader 
and BIA official Jack Plumage says, "The quote-unquote 
Indian problem is a non-Indian problem, because Indians have 
had no input in determining their own destiny."*^ This view 
holds that Indians today are merely a product of the system 
under which they have lived — a system which has allowed 
the federal government to make their decisions for them, 
and, thereby, to cripple self-determination and cultural 
viability. 
John Mohawk, an Indian writer who has written 
extensively about natural resource development on 
reservations, blames the current situation on what he calls 
"the reservation experience."*® In a presentation at 
Humboldt State University in June 1986, Mohawk said: "The 
reservation experience has taught us that we are not capable 
of thinking for ourselves." 
6 
Montana's Indians also ask that society look at each 
reservation separately: as homelands for ethnically distinct 
people and governments. Each reservation is different, they 
say, with highly variable historical and cultural roots and 
sharply contrasting land and natural resource bases. 
For example, Montana's seven reservations represent 
at least 10 tribes, arriving in the state at different times 
and under different circumstances. Some of the tribes were 
allies; some were bitter enemies. In addition, these tribes 
also have unique relationships with the federal government, 
due to the varying conditions under which their reservations 
were established. Resource bases are also varied. The 
Blackfeet, Fort Peck, Crow, Northern Cheyenne, and Flathead 
reservations have significant natural resource bases, while 
the Rocky Boy's and Fort Belknap reservations are resource-
poor. Yet, even those reservations with resources have been 
unable to convert them into viable economic assets. 
Despite the many variables, there are certain 
problems, certain impediments to economic viability, that 
occur on nearly all reservations. Many of those problems 
were identified in 1984 in the controversial Report and 
Recommendations to the President of the United States by a 
special presidential commission.*^ In general terms, the 
problems are: 
— Lack of money. It takes money to make money. Most 
tribes have little or no savings and a very limited ability 
to raise income. Rocky Boy's Reservation, where annual 
tribal revenues are less than $300,000, is perhaps the 
poorest reservation in Montana, but it is not that atypical. 
The view from there is voiced by Rocky Boy's BIA 
Superintendent Karole Overberg, who says: "With no money in 
the bank you can dream, but you can't get anything \ 
started. 
Indian leaders recognize that the so-called "easy 
money" days of President Lyndon Johnson's 1960s Great 
Society are over, and they find themselves competing with 
other tribes and non-Indian governments for dwindling 
federal grants and loans. They also say that, while Great 
Society dollars may have funded industrial parks and 
housing, those projects were applied broadly over all 
reservations and did not meet the highly variable needs or 
economic realities of specific reservations. As a result, 
many, like a carpet factory at Crow Agency, or an industrial 
park in Browning, have generally failed. 
Today, the money that most Indian governments can 
raise, commonly through resource development or land 
leasing, is used to pay for basic social programs and the 
cost of running their own governments. Tribal governments 
have grown in size and function as tribes take on increasing 
responsibility from the federal government through 638 
contracting. Pressure from the federal government, in the 
form of decreased financial support, only serves to 
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encourage rapid resource exploitation rather than long-term 
resource planning. 
Further, while the 638 process has accelerated the 
switch to tribal control, it has simultaneously crippled the 
Indians' ability to act. According to Blackfeet tribal 
Treasurer Elouise Cobell, tribal governments have found that 
after taking over management of a service, a service 
previously funded by the federal government (and still may 
be considered a trust responsibility), the federal 
government will likely reduce its financial support for that 
service.2* Tribal government is then left with the financial 
burden of funding the program or facing the political wrath 
of tribal members when services decline, she says. The 
result, Cobell says, is that tribal governments are 
questioning why they should drain their bank accounts and 
shoulder the cost of programs that they believe are trust 
responsibilities of the federal government. The incentive of 
self sufficiency turns then to leaving as much 
responsibility with the federal government as possible. 
Billings-Area BIA Director Richard Whitesell admits that the 
"638" process isn't working and that it should be re­
evaluated .22 
— Lack of human resources. While Indian 
reservations, with high unemployment, have a large pool of 
% 
workers, too many of the people do not have the needed ^ -
vocational training or educational background in such fields 
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J  ̂  * 
as business, natural resource management, and law." -
What's worse, though, is that those Indians who do 
leave their reservation for vocational or academic pursuits 
are often shunned by their own people upon their return. 
Crow tribal Planner Leonard Bends remembers returning from 
Eastern Montana College in Billings to his reservation 
several years ago and being challenged by tribal elders.24 
He says the elders told him he didn't belong on the 
reservation anymore, that somehow he had been tainted by the 
white man's education. But that's not the only reason he was 
told to leave. College-educated Indians can find work off 
the reservation, he was told, so tribal government jobs — 
positions which represent just about the only work available 
on a reservation — should go to the non-educated Indians 
because they can't find work off the reservation. 
— Attitude and morale problems. Depressed economic^ 
conditions on reservations can lead to despair and can fuel 
a cycle of poverty, tribal leaders say. In addition, many 
Indians who begin to do well in business are shunned by 
fellow tribal members if they succeed. Blackfeet attorney 
Joe McKay, former tribal business councilman and president 
of the Blackfeet Indian Writing Co., calls this phenomenon 
J s 
"Indian jealously." It is common to most reservations, and 
it discourages Indians from becoming entrepreneurs, McKay 
says. The problem involves the "keeping up with the Jones' 
theory," he says. In non-Indian society, when people see 
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their neighbors doing well, they want to do well also. 
Success breeds success and becomes a motivational force 
behind the overall improvement of the standard of living in 
a community. But in Indian country, McKay says, a successful 
member of the tribe will face jealousy and antagonism. 
— Tribal politics. "Investors don't want to touch 
us with a 10-foot pole we're so damn unstable," says 
Northern Cheyenne leader Joe Little Coyote.2® The Northern 
Cheyenne have had three tribal presidents in the past two 
years. Two have been thrown out of office: one was impeached 
by the tribe, the other by the tribal council. The problem 
of political instability is by no means limited to the 
Northern Cheyenne. Economic development specialists on all 
Montana reservations, with the exception of those at Fort 
Peck, acknowledge that their governments have been unstable, 
or, at best, unable to maintain consistency in their 
decisions. 
The BIA's Richard Whitesell says Indian leaders 
should be elected based on qualifications and not, as is 
often the case, on how large a block of relatives the 
candidate can assemble. In-fighting, political corruption, 
and rapid turnover on tribal councils makes long-term 
planning nearly impossible, he says. 
— Poor business management. The President's 
Commission on Indian Reservation Economies ranked this as 
the top tribal problem. Tribal officials from various Indian 
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planning offices around the state concur, saying that many 
Indian leaders lack the business skills needed to function 
effectively in the modern business world. "Management on the 
reservations is more scarce than money," says Merle Lucas, 
who directs the Montana Inter-tribal Policy Board in 
Billings.2^ Non-Indian business leaders find it frustrating 
to deal with elected tribal leaders, who often lack the 
business savvy found in the outside business world, 
? ft 
according to the Rocky Boy's grants writer Tom Weist. ° 
Weist, a non-Indian who has worked on several 
reservations, says that tribal politicians will sometimes 
show up late for meetings, or leave early, and may quickly 
reverse their decisions on short notice. He says many non-
Indians who would like to do business on a reservation 
become frustrated with tribal business management. 
Recognizing these problems, a trend exists in Montana for 
tribal planning offices to establish economic development 
corporations to carry out day-to-day development activities. 
— Jurisdictional problems. Conducting business on a 
reservation means compliance with many Indian regulations in 
addition to regulations imposed by various agencies within 
federal and state governments. Often the distinction between 
those jurisdiction is unclear. 
— Indian preference in employment. Tribal 
governments can set quotas on federally contracted jobs 
carried out on reservations. While quotas can ensure Indian 
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employment in certain circumstances, quotas are criticized 
for causing higher labor costs, especially when there is an 
absence of trained workers. Indian preference laws can be 
demanding. The Blackfeet Reservation, for example, seeks 95-
percent Indian employment, a standard that may prevent an 
? Q 
off-reservation business from coming to the reservation. ^ 
— The BIA. The BIA, a major Indian employer, is 
seen by many as a self-perpetuating bureaucracy that absorbs 
federal dollars in administration, leaving a relatively 
small percentage of those dollars to Indians. Reluctance on 
the part of some BIA personnel to encourage self-
determination policies is fueled by a fear that such 
policies may spell an end to the BIA, and the loss of their 
jobs on a reservation where unemployment is already too 
high. 
Despite these and other problems, Indian leaders in 
Montana remain optimistic. They say their people are better 
off than 10 years ago, perhaps not financially, but 
certainly in terms of education and sophistication. There's 
another factor, though, and it involves a change in work 
ethics and attitudes that Northern Cheyenne leader Dennis 
Limberhand, a Montana Power official at Colstrip, has seen 
over the past decade or so. "The work ethic is just catching 
on," he says, adding, "our generation is really the first 
generation of lunch-packers."-^ 
Indian leaders agree that progress is painfully 
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slow, but Fort Belknap BIA official Jack Plumage points out 
that Indians have been in the business of self-government 
for just 50 years. It was not until 1934 that Indians were 
allowed to practice their existing form of government, 
modeled after the dominant society's. 
Just as an Indian bumper sticker, in recalling one 
of the most famous of Indian battles, says "Custer got 
Siouxed," today's Indians are waging their own battles in 
courtrooms, often over the control of natural resources. 
Indian attorney and activist John Echohawk of the Native 
American Rights Fund in Boulder, Colo., says: "Indians have 
finally learned the good old American way ... suing 
everybody. 
"Nobody is going to give us anything. You go to 
court and fight for it," he says.^* Indians, with less than 
1 percent percent of the country's total population, have 
little political clout, Echohawk says. But they have legal 
clout stemming from treaties. On the national scene, Indians 
have in recent years won some significant victories, 
including the $81.5 million settlement by Maine's Penobscot 
and Passamaquoddy tribes for lands illegally confiscated 200 
years ago and the $122 million settlement by South Dakota's 
Lakota Sioux for the white man's illegal acquisition of the 
Black Hills a century ago.^2 Other tribes have won back 
aboriginal hunting and fishing rights. 
However, there is another type of battle being won 
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by Indians. These battles are much less publicized than 
multi-million treaty settlements, yet their impact is 
perhaps much longer lasting. They involve a slow but steady 
growth in tribal responsibility over their natural 
resources, and often, as a result, a growing amount of 
control over non-Indians who live within a reservation's 
boundaries. The Confederated Salish and Kootenai of the 
Flathead Reservation have, for example, won, through court 
decisions, the right to control the bed and banks of the 
southern shore of Flathead Lake and to require recreational 
visitors to carry a permit. 
Tribal governments have also been doing their own 
business negotiations lately, and they have won better 
payments for their resources than in the past, when the 
less-profit-minded BIA did the negotiations. The Blackfeet 
and Fort Peck tribes have taken advantage of a 1982 law that 
allows tribal governments the authority to enter into joint 
ventures with resource development companies. Instead of a 
flat percentage of the profits, these tribal governments 
have made deals to allow them to share equally from profits 
on oil and gas wells. In addition, Assiniboine and Sioux at 
Fort Peck were the second Indians in the nation to drill 
their own oil well — a risky venture that has brought in 
$500,000 so far.33 
The Fort Peck tribes have converted their natural 
resource revenue into an industrial concern that is among 
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the largest in the state. A&S Industries in Poplar employs 
up to 500 people. It manufactures netting and aluminum 
medical chests for the U.S. military. And the Blackfeet are 
using money from their recent joint venture with ARCO to re­
establish a bank on the reservation. 
Montana Power's Colstrip projects have employed 
scores of Northern Cheyenne after the Northern Cheyenne 
declared their neighboring reservation a pristine, Class I 
airshed. Based on that classification, the Northern Cheyenne 
negotiated a settlement allowing Colstrip coal development 
to continue, but only under conditions that were favorable 
to the Northern Cheyenne. Meanwhile, the Crow maintain the 
state's only Indian coal mine, an open-pit development that 
has generated more than $28 million in royalties for the 
tribe since 1974."^ 
The Salish and Kootenai, who acknowledge that they 
are among the most blessed Indians in terms of their 
abundance of renewable resources, have taken an aggressive 
position to ensure water quality and the natural beauty of 
Flathead Lake, one of their most important natural 
resources. They have also recently negotiated a lucrative 
contract with Montana Power over the operation of the 180-
megawatt Kerr Dam on the Flathead River. Montana Power, 
which had paid a rent of less than $1 million for most of 
the dam's first 50 years, will pay the Salish and Kootenai 
$9 million per year — adjusted to inflation — for the next 
16 
30 years and will then turn the dam over to the tribes. 
The position that the Salish and Kootenai are in now 
allows former Flathead Tribal Vice-Chairman Ron Therriault 
to dismiss assertions that economic development has to be 
defined in terms of resource exploitation.^ 
"People say that if you do these things 
(environmental protection) you can't grow," he says. "Well 
maybe you can't grow as an industrial power, but we don't 
necessarily want to grow as an industrial power." 
In all the above cases, tribal governments find 
themselves trying to make the best out of their own 
particular situation. And while it is easy to write a story 
of despair, focusing on the poverty and disease, it's clear 
that a number of Indian leaders are indeed trying to solve 
their many problems. 
According to the policy board's Merle Lucas, the 
most promising trend has been a shift in tribal leaders from 
older and less educated to a new generation of younger, more 
educated Indians. He says he believes that this trend must 
continue, because reservations cannot stay isolated from the 
outside world forever. If tribal leaders are not prepared to 
change, they are going to get "lost in the shuffle," Lucas 
says. 
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PART ONE 
EASTERN MONTANA'S INDIAN RESERVATIONS 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE BLACKFEET INDIAN RESERVATION 
Poverty and Potential; 
A Land of Contrasts 
Tucked against the grandeur of Glacier National 
Park, an attraction to more than 2 million visitors a year, 
the people of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation live in 
relative isolation where the wind-blown Northern Great 
Plains abruptly meet the ice-carved peaks of the Rocky 
Mountains. 
This is a relatively rich and diverse land, a 1.5-
million-acre portion of northern Montana ranging in 
elevation from 9,000 feet near Glacier Park to 3,400 feet on 
the reservation's eastern boundary. Its natural resources 
include oil and gas (accounting for about 60 percent of the 
tribe's revenue), water, coal, and a land base that tribal 
planners believe could support farming, ranching, and 
commercial hunting and fishing — all at the same time.^ 
However, the economic reality to the approximately 
5,500 tribal members who live on the reservation reads like 
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that of many other Indian reservations: capital is in short 
supply, as are people trained or educated in modern 
technology. The tribe must also deal with a confusing array 
of local, state, federal, and Indian bureaucracies. 
Officially, the Billings-Area Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA) office estimates tribal unemployment at 36 
percent. But tribal leaders say 80 percent is closer to the 
truth, and local BIA officials will agree.^ More than half 
the Blackfeet population lives in poverty.^ Alcoholism and 
other health problems are prevalent, and a tragic number of 
young tribal members die in traffic accidents, often after 
drinking. 
Declining tribal revenues from oil and gas, along 
with a depressed agricultural market, and the federal 
government budget squeeze, all combine to make economic 
development — specifically, the creation of Indian jobs — 
a necessity of tribal government.^ 
Blackfeet treasurer Elouise Cobell says tribal 
revenues (what the tribe can raise from oil and gas leases 
and rangeland or farmland leases, for example) dropped from 
$6 million in 1985 to under $4 million in 1986. In addition, 
she says federal aid dropped $1 million in 1986 to about $6 
million.^ She says tribal leaders, who manage the affairs of 
a government serving the needs of the state's largest Indian 
tribe (about 12,700, the majority of whom live off the 
reservation), expect the trend to continue. 
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Another problem has been the lack of a bank on the 
reservation. The First National Bank of Browning closed in 
O 
late 1983 due to poor management practices. Since that 
time, reservation residents have had to travel to Cut Bank, 
a 70-mile round trip, for the nearest banking services. 
As the Great FalIs Tribune reported at the time of 
the closure, the sudden loss of a financial institution, 
with assets of $13.3 million, placed a significant burden on 
local businesses, consumers, and the already stressed local 
economy. "Approximately 150 people — businessmen, ranchers, 
farmers and Blackfeet tribal members — agreed the problem 
is simple enough. Without a bank, there is no mechanism to 
cash the nearly $800,000 a week in payroll checks," the 
Tribune's Browning correspondent John Barber wrote after 
Q 
attending a community meeting. He added, "Merchants are 
afraid that if residents leave the reservation to cash their 
checks, they might also buy their consumer goods out of 
town." 
Merchants' fears apparently came true. According to 
Blackfeet Reservation BIA Superintendent William Gipp, the 
flow of money off the reservation since 1983 to banking 
institutions and retail outlets in regional centers like Cut 
Bank, Great Falls, and Kalispell has been crippling.1® 
Meanwhile, a new bank is scheduled to open in 1987. 
At the outset, it will be 75 percent tribally owned and 25 
percent owned by non-Indian investors. Tribal government has 
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planned to sell all but 20 percent of its shares within five 
years, with a goal of keeping volatile tribal politics out 
of the bank's management. Nevertheless, the new bank will 
likely inherit a problem reported at the time of the former 
bank's closure: an inconsistent and political tribal court 
that prevented the bank from collecting on bad loans in 
cases where tribal court had jurisdiction. 
Securing a new bank was one of several goals 
outlined in the reservation's five-year economic development 
program begun in April 1984. Other goals, such as creating 
500 new jobs on the reservation, are proving allusive. One 
key problem, according to University of Montana Native 
American Studies Director Ken Pepion, is a lack of skilled 
workers and educated leaders.^ Recognizing his bias toward 
formal education, Pepion, a Blackfeet tribal member, says he 
doubts whether his tribe has the human resources needed to 
bring about an economic turnaround given the climate of 
federal budget cuts and economic recession. Like many of 
Montana's Indians, Pepion says he believes federal Indian 
policy has become an insidious form of economic termination 
disguised in the morally lofty language of self-sufficiency. 
Tribal members need to learn basic job skills, as 
well as gain knowledge in business, natural resource 
management, and law, Pepion says. But like on other Montana 
reservations, education — the kind offered off a 
reservation in "white man's" schools — is not widely 
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accepted by tribal members, says 33-year-old Blackfeet 
tribal member Joe McKay.^ McKay, with his law degree from 
the University of Montana, represents a new generation of 
Indian leaders. Speaking from personal experience, McKay 
says tribal members who leave home for college return with 
new ideas that are perceived as a threat to Indians who do 
not have that education. 
McKay also criticizes Indians who say that their 
traditional values of sharing wealth and taking care of the 
land cannot mesh with the larger, white, so-called 
"capitalistic" society. The Blackfeet, like tribes across 
the country, are enjoying a cultural rebirth, and many 
Indians question whether today's Native Americans can become 
good entrepreneurs in a system they believe is based on 
greed. McKay rejects these criticisms by saying that 
business owners can follow their native traditions, so long 
as they take care of business first. Native culture can 
remain intact, he says, so long as his people understand 
that culture also evolves. McKay warns against "living in 
the past." 
Tribal politics, which typically lead to a near-
complete turnover on the tribal business council every two 
years, are called "cutthroat" and "counterproductive" by 
Pepion. Planning efforts are often redirected when the 
council changes, and credibility is damaged by occasional 
political acts of favoritism by certain tribal leaders. 
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Pepion says the traditional Blackfeet way is for an elder to 
take care of his own family. Nepotism is not always 
recognized as wrong, he says, even though the federal 
government considers it illegal. 
Despite economic, social, and political gloom, there 
remains a spirit of optimism on the Blackfeet Reservation, 
thanks in part to the reservation's natural resource base, 
its potential for tourism and recreation, and the recent 
accreditation and tribal support for the Blackfeet Community 
College. Tribal leaders say that seeing 67 students graduate 
from the college in 1986 — during its first year of 
accreditation — is a sign that the reservation is moving in 
the right direction. 
The Blackfeet "have got a handle on what they need 
to do, as opposed to just throwing up their hands," and they 
are actively striving for self sufficiency, says the BIA's 
Gipp. His optimism is shared by McKay, an ex-tribal 
councilman who used his legal skills to help negotiate a 
multi-million oil and gas contract with ARCO and re­
establish the bank in Browning. 
"Even though times are tough on the reservation, the 
fact that the tribe is still here shows that we are 
survivors," says McKay. "We have a lot of optimism here, 
because we can see a lot of potential." 
McKay now presides over the Blackfeet's only 
industry, a pen and pencil manufacturing company that 
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employs about 45 tribal members. The tribally owned 
Blackfeet Indian Writing Co., a nationally recognized Indian 
success story that has floundered this decade, reorganized 
in 1984. It is once again showing a profit, according to 
plant manager Tom McKay, Joe's brother.^ One reason for the 
turn-around, Tom McKay says, is that tribal government 
recognizes that efficiency, even at the expense of some 
tribal jobs, is essential for the enterprise to survive. The 
plant, which used to employ about twice as many tribal 
members, is now producing more pens and pencils with half 
the number of employees, according to McKay. 
The ARCO deal, made possible through 1982 federal 
legislation that gave tribes more control over their natural 
resources, places the Blackfeet in a position to share 
equally in ARCO's future profits should the oil company find 
a significant petroleum field. The deal also provided more 
than $1 million in up-front bonus payments, as well as 
specific provisions for Indian employment and college 
scholarships. 
Like many other organizations or agencies in 
Montana, the Blackfeet are looking at tourism and related 
recreational industries as a potential economic building 
block. However, one of the first steps toward reaching that 
goal will be to clean up the town of Browning, home to about 
1,100 Indians and 125 whites.15 
At Browning City Hall, first-year mayor Julene 
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Pepion Kennerly, the nation's first Indian woman mayor, has 
hired a young, educated staff of tribal members who have 
begun to implement a plan for turning around the area's 
economy. The focal point of their plan is to change 
Browning's image, and to dispell the attitude of defeatism 
she and others say has plagued the community.1^ 
Town Planner Wayne Juneau sees Browning's role as a 
catalyst for economic development on the reservation.1^ 
Governments — city, county, state, federal and tribal — 
have "fought like cats and dogs" over the years, he says, 
and these jurisdictional problems have had a "chilling 
effect" on accomplishing economic development goals. 
However, he points to the accomplishments of Kennerly in her 
first year, and predicts "a warming trend." 
According to Kennerly, city government has achieved 
the following since she took office in January 1986: 
— Glacier County commissioners, who normally meet 
in the county seat of Cut Bank located off the reservation, 
held a meeting with Indians in Browning. 
— An organizational summit meeting of officials 
from Toole, Flathead, Glacier and Pondera counties was held 
to prepare for the anticipated 13 million vehicles that are 
expected to pass through these counties on their way to the 
1988 Winter Olympics at Calgary, Alta. 
— A Browning beautification program has been 
launched. Junk cars are being removed, a street sweeper 
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cleans streets once a week, and more than 1,000 trees were 
planted. 
The beautification program is aimed at getting more 
of the tens of thousands of tourists who pass through 
Browning each year on U.S. Highway 2 to stop and shop, eat a 
meal, or spend a night before they go on to Glacier Park, 
which is just 15 miles west. However, motels and restaurants 
are few. And many of the town's buildings — including 
motels, restaurants, and gas stations — are run down. Many 
have broken and boarded-up windows. Most are adorned with 
graffiti. The same picture of poverty is also painted on the 
town's government housing, public buildings, and schools. 
Joe McKay admits that, esthetically, Browning 
doesn't "have a lot to look at." 
That's also the view of Lewistown architect Jeff 
Shelden, who, last year, completed a Browning Redevelopment 
Plan for the city. Shelden, who interviewed a number of the 
town's business people, most of whom are white, wrote: "most 
merchants realize that Browning does attract attention, but 
in a negative fashion. . . ."i® He reported that the run­
down and dirty appearance of Browning helps perpetuate long­
standing preconceptions that many whites have toward 
Indians. 
Sheldon noted a sharp contrast between the 
spectacular beauty of the reservation's western boundary and 
the bleak appearance of Browning: "The city is easily 
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perceived as a blight on a landscape unparalleled in 
America. Many of the amenities found on the reservation 
disappear in the heart of the city. Traditionalists speak of 
reverence for the land, yet junk cars, litter, and debris 
pile up on top of it thoughout the city. How long the 
Blackfeet can live with this disparity is only a matter of 
time." 
Despite its current appearance, Browning can, 
however, fit into long-range tourism and recreational 
development plans. One logical idea calls for the city of 
Browning, after a clean-up effort, to be the place where 
Indian culture is stressed, while scenic and recreational 
resources are emphasized along the mountains and near the 
park. 
In 1985 and 1986, the tribe seemed to be heading in 
both directions, by making efforts to clean up Browning and 
by purchasing the KOA campgrounds franchise for Glacier 
County and operating two campgrounds near Glacier Park. In 
the case of the campgrounds, KOA will provide management 
expertise that was lacking in a previous efforts to run a 
campground, tribal leaders hope. 
Tribal planner Ed Aubert says there has been some 
interest by tribal leaders in developing a ski resort along 
the border of Glacier Park at Divide Mountain. But Aubert 
acknowledged that the ski area would cost up to $50 million 
and would be a risky venture given the reservation's remote 
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location. The only way he believes such a venture would be 
feasible is if it were developed in stages. 
Aubert warns, though, that the tribe may not be 
willing to accept tourism on a large scale. He says a 
significant number of Indians don't want more whites to 
visit or live on the reservation. Tourism would have to be 
promoted in a tactful manner, he says, adding that it would 
have to be acceptable to the majority of tribal members. The 
Missoula-based Institute of the Rockies, together with the 
tribal tourism project, is encouraging a regionally 
coordinated culturally and environmentally sensitive form of 
tourism. 
Obviously, the St. Mary and Babb areas along Highway 
89, which offer perhaps the most spectacular Rocky Mountain 
Front scenery between the Canadian and Mexican borders, will 
play a essential role in any developing tourism industry. 
Glacier-fed streams and lakes extend from the park into an 
area of great ecological diversity typically found in the 
plains-to-mountains transition, giving the Blackfeet prime 
hunting and fishing potential. McKay points to studies by 
the federal govenment which list the Blackfeet reservation 
sixth nationally in miles of fishing streams, and fifth in 
the number and size of lakes that could be managed for 
fishing. 
A potential is seen for commercial hunting. As it 
stands now, non-Indians can purchase tribal permits for 
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fishing, but hunting by non-members is prohibited on the 
reservation. As a result, McKay and Aubert recognize that 
commercial hunting — hunting which would require tribal 
members sharing that resource with outsiders and would no-
doubt irritate certain traditionalists — would be 
controversial. 
However, other tribes, particularly in the 
southwest, have done well by offering guided big-game 
hunting services. And some people think the Blackfeet could 
do just as well. Due to its proximity to Glacier Park and 
the Bob Marshall Wilderness Area, the Blackfeet could offer 
hunts for just about all the big-game species that make up 
legends of the West: elk, white-tail and mule deer, 
antelope, sheep, mountain goats, grizzly bears, and black 
bears. A new addition to the hunting experience, the cry of 
the wolf, can now be heard as that species is making a slow 
recovery in Glacier Park and along the Front. Tribal members 
may even be able to exploit a desire by certain tourists who 
seek to capture the mystique of the Old West by offering 
guided wilderness adventures. 
The development of commercial hunting and fishing 
would require better management of land, water, and wildlife 
resources, McKay and Aubert say. Coordinated efforts with 
the several federal and state agencies involved would be 
necessary. They say a significant capital investment in land 
and resource management would be required, but note that 
32 
tribal government is moving in that direction. 
Like other reservations, the Blackfeet are using 
their natural resource base to assert what they believe to 
be their treaty rights and to pursue their goals of self 
determination. One recent issue provides a good example of 
the clash between two cultures and various jurisdictions. 
This issue revolves around a controversial portion of the 
Lewis and Clark National Forest known as the Badger-Two 
Medicine. This unit of land has become the focal point of a 
battle between the Forest Service and the Blackfeet Indians, 
pitting the tribe and a local environmental group (the 
Glacier-Two Medicine Alliance and its Missoula-based Badger 
Chapter) against the federal government and oil interests, 
who see great potential for oil and gas development in the 
area. 
More than 102,000 acres of the Badger-Two Medicine 
are without roads. Because of its proximity to Glacier Park 
and its role as habitat for the threatened grizzly bear, the 
Badger-Two Medicine is considered to be a prime site for 
wilderness designation. Montana's Congressional delegation 
has not included this area in previous wilderness bills, 
however, because the Blackfeet retain certain limited rights 
to the area, rights which would likely be precluded under 
wilderness designation. 
In late 1986, a group of Blackfeet, with the 
endorsement of tribal government, appealed the Lewis and 
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Clark National Forest Plan which would allow oil and gas 
1 9 
development in the area. 7 Traditionalists claim the area is 
spiritual. To develop it, they say, would be comparable to 
tearing down a church or temple and would violate their 
rights under the First Amendment and the Native American 
Religious Freedom Act. 
This group of traditionalists say they want the 
federal government to turn the land over to the Indians so 
they can manage it as a spiritual area. Yet one can't look 
at the depth of economic despair on the reservation and 
wonder if the traditionalists would be overruled, should the 
tribe ever control that land and petroleum was found. 
The fate of that appeal has not been determined, and 
a lengthy court battle is likely — a battle that has the 
potential to divide the tribe between development interests 
and religious interests, alienate the Forest Service, and 
leave non-Indian environmentalists who back the Blackfeet 
traditionalists feeling betrayed. If this indeed is the 
scenerio which is ultimately played out on the Badger-Two 
Medicine, it would be an example of business as usual on an 
Indian reservation. But if the various interests can work 
together, the Badger-Two Medicine may provide an excellent 
example of how co-management and political compromise can 
work to meet the needs of all involved. It certainly has the 
potential for such an experiment in cooperation. 
Meanwhile, at BIA headquarters in Browning, 
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Superintendent Gipp sums up his feelings about the 
Blackfeet, and, in fact, all Indians. Gipp says that Indians 
just need to ride out today's rough economic times and those 
expected in the near future. If today's Indians can hang on 
now, he believes they'll have a good chance to eventually 
reach their goals of economic self-sufficiency and political 
self-determination in the next century. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE FORT PECK INDIAN RESERVATION 
Oi1 and Gas, Farming and Industry: 
Wide-ranging Tribal Enterprises 
of the Assiniboine and Sioux 
Northeast Montana's Assiniboine and Sioux tribes are 
economic leaders among the state's seven Indian 
reservations. Oil, gas, sand and gravel, bentonite, and 
water are abundant and still relatively undeveloped on the 
2-million acre Fort Peck Indian Reservation, which is 
located on rolling plains above the Missouri River. 
These two tribes, with a combined enrollment of 
8,500 and a resident population of about 4,500, have been 
successful in working together to develop their oil and gas 
reserves. They are the only tribes to negotiate a water 
rights pact with the state, and they have turned money 
derived from their natural resources into a relatively 
diversified tribal economy. 
Bureau of Indian Affairs Superintendent Dennis 
Whiteman describes Fort Peck tribal leaders as 
"progressive."1 He says they've done well because they don't 
wait to see how tribal leaders at other reservations do 
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things. In fact, the Fort Peck tribes are cited by other 
eastern Montana reservations as a role model. Whiteman 
praises Fort Peck Indians for looking to management 
expertise off the reservation when needed. 
The Fort Peck tribes have accomplished something 
unique in Montana's Indian country: they've developd a major 
industrial sector of their economy. A&S (Assiniboine and 
Sioux) Tribal Industries, the envy of other Montana tribes, 
especially those along the Hi-Line, employs more than 450 
people — 75 percent of whom are Indian. The plant turns 
sheet aluminum into military medical chests and bulk rolls 
of netting into custom camouflage. It has become one of the 
largest manufacturing firms in Montana. 
A&S Industries is tribally owned but is managed by 
an outside firm, the Brunswick Corp., which produces a 
diversified line of products from sporting goods to military 
hardware. Most of the work at A&S Industries is done by 
hand, which allows the tribes to hire many people, according 
to A&S Program Manager Daryl Boyd. Assembly of the medical 
chests requires up to 147 steps, and the netting requires 
meticulous squaring, cutting, sewing, and inspection. 
By capitalizing on military contracts, and by 
seeking minority tax and business advantages, A&S Industries 
has shown steady growth since it began operations 11 years 
ago. This success leads tribal Chairman Kenneth Ryan to 
boast: "We have a very significant economic impact on this 
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area."3 
A&S Industries has, for example, generated more than 
than $90 million in sales, including more than $22 million 
in 1985; growth is predicted through at least 1989.^ It has 
expanded from 160 employees in 1975 to a peak of 499 
employees in 1985.^ And the company paid more than $6.3 
million in wages in 1985.^ Since non-Indian make up about 
one-fourth of the labor force, Ryan says the plant helps to 
ease racial tensions in the community and shows tribal 
government's interest in being a good neighbor. 
The Fort Peck tribes also own a small electronics 
firm, West Electronics Inc. It began operating in 1970 under 
the name Multiplex, in a joint venture with a New York 
company. The tribes purchased Multiplex five years later and 
continue to assemble a variety of computer parts at the 
Poplar facility. In 1986, West Electronics had contracts to 
assemble modems for telecommunications, printed circuit 
cards, electronic counters, and a digital caliper sensitive 
enough to measure the size difference between two strands of 
hair.^ The company, with a dozen employees, also took on its 
first in-state contract in 1986: a computerized device that 
attaches around a cow's neck and counts the number of times 
its head goes up and down during feeding. Sales in 1985 were 
about $450,000, and 1986 sales were predicted to reach 
$750,000.8 
The success of these enterprises has given the 
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tribes a good track record, according to tribal planner 
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Lonnie Reddog. And Reddog says there's nothing like a good 
track record to attract "seed money" for new projects or for 
the expansion of existing business ventures. Other tribes in 
Montana with poor track records are at a disadvantage when 
competing against the Fort Peck tribes for economic 
development opportunities such as grants, special loans, or 
new business enterprises, he says. 
Fort Peck's political stability — atypical of 
Montana reservations — has also been a positive factor. A&S 
Industries president and tribal executive board member 
Norman Hollow, who is credited with leading the tribes into 
the modern era, was tribal chairman for 12 years. He retired 
from the tribes' top post in October 1985. 
Planning efforts have been consistent, also atypical 
of Montana reservations. Reddog and chief planner Rodney 
Miller, both college educated, have been with tribal 
government for a decade, providing steady leadership in the 
tribes' planning office. In addition, they are among the few 
Indian planners in Montana to praise their elected 
leadership, the executive board, for recognizing the need to 
develop and follow long-range plans for economic growth. 
Also atypical of Montana reservations, these two planners 
say that even though there has been considerable turnover on 
their executive tribal board, new council members have built 
on the work of their predecessors instead of trying 
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something new. 
The most recent tribal economic development plan, 
dated January 1986, looks at the past, present, and future, 
with an emphasis on how the Fort Peck tribal government has 
fared with its implementation of previous plans.The plan 
identifies the tribes' strengths and weaknesses, and it sets 
priorities. It is written in a professional manner, and 
provides a good profile of tribal economic activity. By 
contrast, planning efforts on virtually all other Montana 
reservations — with the exception of the Flathead Indian 
Reservation — are considered inadequate by BIA officials or 
tribal leaders who specialize in economic development.^ 
Miller says that Fort Peck is where it is at today 
because it was able to build on money made available during 
President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society days of the 1960s. 
During that time, the tribal government decided that it 
could not make it on farming and ranching alone, and decided 
to diversify, he says. 
By building on foundations identified in a 1970 BIA 
report which assessed the Fort Peck's economic potential, 
1 y 
they followed a plan based on their unique circumstances. * 
That report recognized that Fort Peck is relatively isolated 
from large population, manufacturing, or marketing centers. 
Yet it identified a natural resource base that was diverse 
and rich: energy resources, water, hunting, fishing, and 
boating. For people who don't mind living in rural areas or 
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on the Great Plains, the Fort Peck Reservation was 
identified as a place where quality of life could be high. 
Highlights from that report include the following: 
— The nearby Fort Peck Reservoir and Missouri River 
could be a major regional recreation destination for 
camping, hunting, fishing, and boating.13 
— Water is abundant, thanks to the Missouri River 
and the nearby Fort Peck reservoir, which has a storage 
capacity of about 14 million acre feet.14 
— Fossil fuel reserves were described as "huge."15 
More than 14 billion tons of coal are estimated to underlie 
the reservation.1^ The reservation is located within the 
oil-rich Williston Basin, which includes most of North 
Dakota, part of South Dakota, and part of Manitoba.1^ The 
center of this oil-producing region is in McKenzie County 
North Dakota, about 40 miles southeast of the reservation. 
— Significant reserves of bentonite, clay, salt, 
sand and gravel, and potash are also within the 
reservation.18 
Sixteen years after the 1970 report, most of those 
resources remain undeveloped, but the tribes have turned 
profits from an expanding oil and gas industry into an 
economy that features a strong manufacturing element. And 
tribal efforts at environmental protection — air and water 
quality management, for example — protect the area's 
potential as a recreational center and enhance the quality 
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of life. Like the Northern Cheyenne and Flathead 
reservations, Fort Peck's airshed has been designated Class 
I, the highest possible under federal law. 
Coal, the reservation's most abundant energy 
resource, remains undeveloped and provides the potential for 
long-term economic security, depending on future technology 
and market conditions. As was predicted in 1970, "If total 
development is ever undertaken, Roosevelt County (the 
majority of which is within the reservation) could possibly 
rank among the nation's most important coal producers."1^ 
Even though there has been no coal development to 
date, oil and gas resources have become a leading source of 
tribal revenue. However, the tribes have learned from 
recent, first-hand experience that the erratic nature of the 
energy business can bring a bust just as easily as a boom. 
A&S tribal Oil and Gas Department Director Ann Lambert says 
that the tribes have been getting about 60 percent less for 
each barrel of oil sold than they were able to get a couple 
o n 
years ago. And she says total revenues from oil and gas, 
including lease payments, were expected to drop by half 
between 19 85 and 19 86.^ 
Tribal officials are reluctant to discuss specific 
details about this budget crunch, but it has clearly been a 
cause of concern. The reservation newspaper reported in July 
1986 that the Fort Peck budget in 1985 had been $8.5 
million, but dropped to $6.4 million in 1986.^ The 1987 
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tribal budget was expected to be about $3.9 million, the 
paper reported, while Ryan said the budget for 1987 could be 
as low as $3 million.23 As a result, officials have imposed 
a 22 percent reduction in all tribal programs, travel 
moratoriums on tribal employees, a four-day work week, and 
salary reductions. Federal budget cuts were complicating 
matters. 
Nevertheless, both Ryan and Lambert speak proudly of 
their oil and gas ventures. They both like to point to two 
significant ventures relating to tribal energy development, 
ventures that have dramatically increased the amount of 
money the Fort Peck tribes make from their energy reserves, 
as well as their say over how those resources will be 
developed. They are: 
— A joint venture with U.S. Energy, a Wyoming firm, 
which places tribal government in a partnership for 
petroleum exploration and extraction on the reservation. The 
joint venture, made possible by the 1982 Indian Mineral 
Leasing and Development Act, will provide the tribes with a 
55 percent royalty once U.S. Energy recovers exploration 
costs.24 Seven wells have been drilled under this joint 
venture. Five have become producers, and the tribes have 
generated more than $3 million in profits from these wells, 
Lambert says. 
— "Winona No. 1," which means first-born girl in 
Sioux language, is the name of the first 100 percent 
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tribally owned well on the reservation. It was planned, 
financed, and drilled entirely by the tribes, which hired 
outside expertise on a consulting basis. Developed in 1984, 
this is only the second all-Indian-owned well in the 
country. It was a gamble, Lambert says, but one that has so 
far paid off by bringing in more than $500,000 in revenue 
through mid-1986. 
The royalty rates, 55 percent and 100 percent 
respectively, from these two tribal ventures are 
significantly higher than rates negotiated by the BIA prior 
to the 1982 law. Billings-based geologist Rick Stefanic says 
that the BIA used to treat Indian land much the same way it 
treated federal lands, usually by allowing development for a 
O C 
flat royalty rate of 12.5 percent. J But under the new law, 
Indian tribes, who now are taking a much more active role in 
resource development negotiations, have much more latitude 
to do what they want, Stefanic says. 
John Echohawk, attorney and executive director of 
the Native American Rights Fund in Boulder, Colo., explains: 
"The BIA used to walk into a council meeting and say, 
'Here's an opportunity to make money. Sign here.' And we 
n f. 
would sign blindly."^0 
In Montana, the Blackfeet are the only other Indian 
tribe to take advantage of the 1982 law. Yet the law is 
being welcomed by all reservations with resources, and 
tribal leaders across Montana say they will be following the 
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lead of Fort Peck and the Blackfeet in the development of 
their oil, gas, or coal. The Council of Energy Resource 
Tribes (CERT), a national Indian organization made up of 
tribes with energy resources, provides a continued lobbying 
effort in Washington, D.C., as well as technical assistance 
to Indian governments seeking to profit from their 
resources. 
While the overall economic growth of the Fort Peck 
tribes has been impressive, they nevertheless face problems 
which threaten to ultimately destroy their very existence. 
Unemployment, at about 40 percent, is still too high for 
tribal leaders, and so is the tribes' poverty rate of about 
? 7 
35 percent. White settlement, allowed by the Dawes Act, 
has broken up tribal land and resource holdings and has 
resulted in a confusing checkerboard ownership. In addition, 
Indians have become a minority within their own reservation. 
The Fort Peck tribes control only 45 percent of their 
reservation's land area, and are outnumbered by whites by 
about 4,500 to 5,500.28 
Tribal chairman Ryan says that his greatest concern 
is for the youth of the tribes, as the Fort Peck Reservation 
moves into its second century of existence, and as its 
9 Q 
people face the complexities of the 21st century. More 
than half of Assiniboine and Sioux children never make it 
through school, and, Ryan says, "If anything is going to do 
us in, that's it."3® 
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Formal education is essential for the survival of 
his people, he says. He recognizes that the next generation 
of Fort Peck Indians needs to build on the accomplishments 
of the 1970s and 1980s. The trick, he says, is to educate 
young people in all of the basics — math, science, reading 
— so that they can go on to college or vocational schools 
and learn the essential professional and technical tools 
necessary for continued economic growth, while at the same 
time making sure that educational programs emphasize their 
unique Assiniboine and Sioux heritage. 
"We do not wear buckskins; we do not live in skin 
dwellings; we are not nomads anymore," he says. "But we are 
still Assiniboine people, and we are still Sioux people." 
And should these identies ever disappear, he says his people 
would become nothing more than another brown-skinned 
minority in the melting pot of America. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE ROCKY BOY'S INDIAN RESERVATION 
Living with a Smal1 Land Base 
and Facing Big Obstacles 
The Chippewa-Cree on northcentral Montana's Rocky 
Boy's Indian Reservation wish to be financially self-
sufficient but are finding it difficult to overcome poverty 
on their own. 
The view from here, according to tribal water rights 
specialist Daryl Wright, is that "the government fed us like 
a baby for 100 years, and now they're taking the bottle away 
— and we don't like it."1 
The spectre of federal budget cuts is not alone in 
casting a shadow over the economic hopes of the 3,300-member 
Chippewa-Cree Tribe? natural resources on this 108,000-acre 
reservation, the smallest in Montana, have been dropping in 
value this decade. Oil, gas, and timber markets have seen a 
general recession since the late 1970s, and agriculture — 
the economic basis of this part of Montana, called the 
Golden Triangle for its wheat production — suffered from 
several years of local drought in addition to a national 
economic decline. 
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While reservations such as the Blackfeet, Flathead, 
Fort Peck, and Crow bring in millions of dollars annually 
from the sale, rent, or leasing of their natural resources, 
the Chippewa-Cree's annual revenue totaled $300,000 in 1985 
and was expected to drop to $200,000 by 1987.2 This makes 
the Chippewa-Cree perhaps the poorest of Montana's Indian 
tribes and virtually 100 percent dependent upon the federal 
government. 
Rocky Boy's problems are aggravated by a burgeoning 
population, which has more than doubled in 25 years.3 Much 
of the growth has come in the past 10 years, as families 
returned to their reservation from urban centers to which 
they had moved under the federal government's Indian 
assimilation and relocation policies of the 1950s and early 
1960s.4 
Tribal member Leon Gardipee provides a good example 
of these policies.5 He's like many Indians in Montana and 
across the nation. After living away from his reservation 
homeland for most of his life, he's back. Gardipee was born 
on the Rocky Boy's in the 1950s. In 1959, as a small child, 
his family was moved by the federal government to Los 
Angeles, where his father was given a job in a factory. 
But there were problems, Gardipee says, because "we 
were hicks." 
His family never really fit into the urban, 
southern California lifestyle. They spoke hardly any 
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English, and they longed for their Montana home. Eventually, 
they returned to Montana, but not the reservation. Years 
later, after living in such places as Helena and Jackson 
Hole, Wyo., Gardipee returned as an adult to Rocky Boy's. He 
says his reasons were basic: something was missing in his 
life, something spiritual. 
Like many Indians on other reservations, he's taking 
advantage of a new local community college. Gardipee's 
studies at Rocky Boy's Stone Child Community College are in 
social work, and he's also taking courses on his people's 
past. He's studying his roots, which run deep on this 
reservation: His great-great-grandfather was Little Bear, 
chief of a displaced band of Chippewas. It was Little Bear 
who, along with the Cree Band's leader Stone Child (the 
white man erroneously translated his name as Rocky Boy) led 
the political fight which culminated in the creation of this 
reservation at Fort Assiniboine in 1916.^ 
As other Chippewa-Cree return to the reservation, as 
the local recession continues and as federal budget cuts 
reduce Indian funding, the economic pressures are likely to 
build. 
These pressures can be measured in a number of ways. 
Among them is the number of people who collect general 
assistance (for the poor who don't qualify for other income 
programs), which amounts to $78 a month for a single person. 
Since 1980, the general assistance rolls have tripled and 
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now account for more than $1 million of the approximate $7 
million the federal government spends annually on the 
reservation.7 
In addition, tribal grants writer Tom Weist, a non-
tribal member who acts as a consultant to the Chippewa-Cree, 
says more than half of the reservation population of about 
O 
2,000 live below the federal poverty guidelines. The number 
of unemployed tribal members has risen from 405 to 778 since 
1980, while the unemployment rate has risen from 58.6 
Q 
percent to 74.8 percent. During those same years, the 
number of employed has dropped from 308 to 261, echoing the 
estimated loss of more than 1,000 jobs in the three-county 
region centered around Havre, Chinook, and Big Sandy.1® 
The reservation's housing situation is as bleak as 
it is for employment and income, according to Kelly 
Parisian, who directs the tribal housing program.11 More 
than 340 reservation families are on a waiting list for 
homes, which means many families are forced to double- or 
triple-up with other families, he says. 
What homes do exist are often in poor shape, with 
many not meeting federal guidelines for safety or 
insulation. Of 450 Indian homes surveyed by the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, Parisian describes 91 as "substandard" and 
47 as "totaled." Some of the reservation's homes were 
designed for Florida but were purchased cheaply and shipped 
to Rocky Boy's back in the early 1960s.12 Parisian says 
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those homes have no foundations, their pipes freeze every 
winter, and stoves were installed near their only exit, 
creating a fire hazard. 
From this poverty, the Chippewa-Cree are faced with 
the task of lifting themselves through education of their 
people, development of their limited natural resource base, 
or attracting an industrial facility. All three approaches 
require money. But with no big-money resource such as coal, 
oil, gas, or hydroelectric power, tribal leaders like Peggy 
Nagel, president of the community college, say developing 
the minds of the Chippewa-Cree is paramount to economic 
13 success. •LJ 
"That's all we have left," says Nagel. "We have to 
develop our human resources." 
Education here has followed the same pattern as on 
other Montana reservations. All seven in Montana can boast 
to having a community college. In general, community college 
programs are tied into specific needs of the tribe. Nagel 
points to coursework in farming and ranching, vocational 
education, and social work. In addition, students are 
required to take courses which teach tribal history, 
culture, and language. 
The reservation's isolation — a problem not only 
for Montana Indian reservations, but one faced by the entire 
state — is considered to be a major impediment to 
attracting industry. Rocky Boy's is 35 miles south of U.S. 
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Highway 2, the nearest major highway, and about 100 miles 
from Great Falls, the regional center for this part of 
Montana. "When you come out to Rocky Boy's, you come to 
Rocky Boy's because you want to," says Bureau of Indian 
Affairs Superintendent Karole Overberg. 
But all is not entirely grim. For example, the 
reservation's housing shortage could help ensure the success 
of a tribal forestry and log-home business. And a tribal 
propane distribution company is turning a profit while 
helping to keep the costs of propane down. More than 
anything else, though, the success of the propane company 
has shown tribal members that they can do something that 
makes money, Weist says. 
There's also the potential for small-scale natural 
resource development, although it is unclear just what 
exploitable resources the tribe has, and whether they can be 
developed commercially. 
Rocky Boy's timber reserves from a 16,000 acre 
commercial forest have been well documented, and these 
reports are available to the public.14 However, reports by 
the federal government discussing the relative availability 
of water, oil, gas, coal, and strategic mineral resources 
are held closely by the tribe and the BIA.15 Tribal and BIA 
officials don't want these reports made public to avoid 
jeopardizing the Chippewa-Cree in future negotiations with 
potential developers.1® Other studies by the Council of 
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Energy Resource Tribes (CERT) are also under way and should 
help the tribe determine its various options. 
Chippewa-Cree Development Project Director Ron Swan, 
natural resource manager for the tribe, says that these 
reports should help his people take advantage of the Indian 
Mineral Leasing and Development Act of 1982. This Act, used 
in Montana on the Blackfeet and Fort Peck reservations with 
oil companies, allows tribes to enter into an equal 
partnership in resource development and provides the 
potential for a far greater economic return than before the 
1982 law. 
However, Swan acknowledges that the Chippewa-Cree 
are conservative when it comes to natural resource 
development. He is not sure how much natural resource 
development tribal members will allow. It has been several 
years since the last timber sale, a clearcut that left scars 
on the land and a sour taste in the mouths of many tribal 
members. In addition, a small ski resort 30 miles south of 
Havre has been the target of vandals who opposed the 
1 7 
commercialization of the area. 
Daryl Wright says he speaks for many of his fellow 
tribal members when he objects to mounting pressure — in 
the form of budget cuts — on the Chippewa-Cree to develop 
their resources. According to Wright, the government is 
telling Indians, "If you have gold, sell it; if you have 
oil, sell it; if you've got timber, sell it," all without 
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regard to future generations. 
While there are traditional and cultural elements 
opposed to resource exploitation on all Montana 
reservations, Rocky Boy's isolation, near-100 percent Indian 
population, and small size combine to form a community 
attitude that will likely constrain resource development. 
The small size of the reservation is a key factor. Rocky 
Boy's is too small to hide the scars of a strip mine, for 
example, and it would be hard to define a natural resource 
sacrifice area because the population is scattered 
1 ft 
throughout the reservation's hills and valleys. ° 
But Swan says some development will be possible, 
starting with the reservation's 16,000 acres of commercial 
forest. The annual allowable cut, identified in the tribal 
forest management plan at 5 million board feet, could bring 
in as much as $125,000 a year, he says. 
Meanwhile, tribal planner Ronnie Joe Henry and his 
staff are assessing the possibilities of several business 
1 Q 
development opportunities. They include: 
— Agriculture. About 50 tribal members graze about 
3,000 head of cattle on the reservation, and there are about 
10 Indian farmers.2® Tribal government also operates a 
4,500-acre wheat and barley farm at Box Elder, but officials 
say it has not turned a profit in recent years. 
Over the long run, BIA Superintendent Overberg says 
agriculture may be the tribe's best economic bet, especially 
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if a Missouri-to-Milk River diversion project is approved. 
That project would cross the reservation near the tribal 
farm, and could irrigate up to 8,000 reservation acres, 
tripling crop yields and raising up to $1 million annually. 
— A tribal log home industry. The tribe hopes that 
such an industry would be designed to provide log homes to 
Indians on the reservation and others in nearby communities. 
Planners say log homes are cheaper to build, warmer in the 
winter, and cooler in the summer. A full-time researcher has 
? 1 
been commissioned to study the possibilities. 
— An ethanol/feedlot project. A consultant is 
studying whether local grain can be used to make ethanol and 
various by-products. Planners say the future of ethanol 
looks promising, partly because the reservation is located 
in the heart of farm country. * They see one of the 
ethanol's by-products, high-protein mash or mash pellots, as 
having the potential for supplying a feedlot in conjuction 
with the tribal farm. 
— An industrial park at Box Elder. In 1982, the 
tribe received a $400,000 grant from the federal government 
to develop a meatpacking plant at an industrial site along a 
railroad spur at Box Elder. The project fell through during 
negotiations, and the tribe had to send the money back. It 
was considered a major set-back.23 Still, tribal planners 
would like to see an industrial park at the site and hope to 
coordinate it with the ethanol/feedlot project, as well as 
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the tribal farm. 
— Recreational development. The ski area could 
become a year-round recreational park. The tribe has 
discussed building a waterslide and a golf course as well as 
hiking trails.24 The Chippewa-Cree believe they could 
capitalize on the attraction of the Bear Paw Mountains, the 
only mountains within a radius of 100 miles. 
For these projects to succeed, the tribe will need 
to overcome a variety of obstacles, but one in particular is 
the lack of capital. Says Wright: "There isn't a chance in 
hell (for economic success) unless we get some financial 
support." 
In a climate of ever-increasing competition for 
federal dollars, the Chippewa-Cree find themselves at a 
disadvantage because of their small size, and because they 
have no track record. 
"We just need that first project," according to 
Weist, who believes the Chippewa-Cree deserve a chance to 
show they can do something successful. 
Yet Weist admits that the problems here, and on many 
other reservations, aren't limited to a lack of federal 
money. Weist, a non-Indian with experience on a number of 
reservations, also sees the Chippewa-Cree dealing with a 
host of internal problems. 
Businesses have difficulty negotiating with tribal 
governments which don't act in a business-like manner, he 
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says, and such has been the case at Rocky Boy's. He says 
elected tribal officials have, at times, lacked "business 
savvy." While the tribal staff may sport college-educated 
Indians who understand the realities of the outside world, 
elected tribal leaders sometimes lack the skills necessary 
to help the tribe function outside of the reservation 
vacuum, he says. 
For example, convincing tribal leaders here of the 
need for solid, long-term economic development plans — the 
kind he says are only now being drawn up by tribal planners 
— has been a difficult task. 
As for the future, Weist says he believes the 
Chippewa-Cree have a chance at economic self-sufficiency, 
although he acknowledges it will probably take a painfully 
long time to reach that goal. Cuts in federal aid only 
hamper the development of a reservation economy, because the 
tribe has very little to build on in the first place. In the 
case of the Chippewa-Cree, it's easy to see how federal 
budget-cutting policies have become perceived as an 
insidious reincarnation of the federal government's 1950s 
termination efforts. 
On a positive note, Overberg praises the Chippewa-
Cree for its educational gains and improvement in the 
professional management of its government. But he admits 
that the Chippewa-Cree, more than other tribes, face an 
uphill struggle for survival. 
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"With no money in the bank, you can dream, but you 
can't get anything started," he says. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE FORT BELKNAP INDIAN RESERVATION 
Lost Wealth, Poor Land, Combine 
to Make Economic Development an A1lusive Goal 
As members of the Assiniboine and Gros Ventre tribes 
of the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation like to tell it, the 
story of economic development on their reservation begins 
with a major rip-off. 
They say theirs is a story of what could have been, 
a story of how today's poverty stricken people on their 
reservation might have become rich beyond their 
imaginations. What happened is quite simple and follows 
similar variations on a theme typically heard in Indian 
Country: whites took advantage of the Indians to gain 
control of a valuable natural resource. 
Delmar "Poncho" Bigby, a tribal planner who 
specializes in water rights and natural resource 
development, also enjoys studying his people's past: pawing 
through old documents, checking out the old maps, 
identifying what's happened to tribal lands. He considers 
himself an expert on the negotiations of 1885 between George 
Bird Grinnell, representing the United States government, 
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and his own forefathers, the tribal leaders at that time.1 
Bigby says that his people received $350,000 for a 
13,000-acre chunk of the Little Rocky Mountains, the 
reservation's only high country. But he claims that 
negotiations were not fair. Grinnell, he says, denied 
Indians information about the land's value, and he gave the 
Indians only two choices: accept the government's offer, or 
starve. 
Indeed, that's what transcripts from the 
negotiations appear to say.2 Here's what Grinnell told the 
Assiniboine and Gros Ventre that year: 
I see that some of you people are 
pretty blind, you can't see far. You see the 
things that are close to your face, but the 
things that are further off you cannot see at 
all. You are like people looking through a 
fog. . . . You think that because for seven 
or eight years, you have had plenty to eat 
and have lived well, for the next year or two 
you are going to have plenty to eat and it 
will always go on like that. That is not 
true; it is not going to last. I go among the 
different people and see them, how they are 
fixed, how many cattle they've got, how they 
farm; I don't see anybody as poor as you. 
Two years from now, if you don't make 
any agreement with the government, you will 
just have to kill your cattle and then you 
will have to starve. . . . The only thing you 
have to sell is this little piece of land 
that you do not use. I should like to see you 
sell that, because if you don't, I cannot 
tell after two years how you will live."3 
The Assiniboine and Gros Ventre did, indeed, follow 
Grinnell's advice to sell the property. But the deal was 
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hardly fair, especially since the option of letting the 
Indians develop their own resources — however ludicrous 
that option must have seemed to Grinnell — was never 
presented. 
During the first few years of this century, the 
former tribal lands in the Little Rockies became a center of 
gold mining activity in Montana. Historical accounts say 
mines at Landusky and Zortman were the most productive in 
the state between 1900 and 1904.^ They remain active today, 
bringing in millions of dollars in revenue for Pegasus Gold, 
a Spokane, Wash., firm. The gross value of gold and silver 
taken out of those hills is reportedly $25 million 
annually.^ The Landusky-Zortman mines employ about 100 
people, and has an annual payroll of $5 million.® 
By contrast, the Fort Belknap tribes are able to 
generate just $500,000 annually, primarly through leasing 
its range- and pasture-land to non-Indian farmers or 
ranchers.^ So when tribal members look south to the 
mountains from their dry prairie landscape in the Milk River 
Valley, it's easy to see why they feel cheated. 
"Can you imagine how wealthy we'd be," asks Lennore 
Stiffarm, a Harvard-educated Ph.D who directs the tribal 
education department and is a special consultant to the 
elected tribal community council.® The answer, although 
speculative, is that the Assiniboine and Gros Ventre could 
well have been the richest Indians in North America, 
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according to Greg Smitman, the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
Q 
natural resource officer. 
Bigby says the tribe is hoping to someday be 
compensated for its loss. He maintains that his forefathers 
were not only taken advantage of by not knowing about the 
gold or its potential value, but that there was no intent on 
the part of his people to "sell" the land. He says Indians 
at that time did not understand the concept of buying and 
selling land. Instead, his forefathers thought that what 
they were doing was more like a "lease," in today's 
terminology, and that the lease has since expired, he says. 
The issue remains unresolved as far as the tribes 
are concerned, and tribal lawyers continue to pursue what 
they believe to be the tribes' legal right to the Little 
Rockies. 
Meanwhile, economic development here focuses on 
education, expanding agriculture, and attracting a 
manufacturing plant to a renovated industrial building. But 
with tribal revenues of about $500,000, there's little left 
over to invest after meeting the costs of running tribal 
government. 
Instead of dwelling on the past, though, tribal 
planners say they are trying to meet the challenges of their 
present situation.1® Like their neighbors at Rocky Boy's, 
the Fort Belknap tribes have no big-money resources. There's 
hope that gold may be discovered in the tribes' remaining 
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portion of the Little Rockies. And it is hard to not notice 
the row of oil wells just off the reservation's western 
boundary. Someday exploration for petroleum resources may 
yield a few producing wells on reservation lands. 
Unemployment is about 78 percent, and more than 65 
percent of the resident Indians lives in poverty.11 Yet 
tribal leaders say they anxiously greet the future. "As 
Indians, we do not have the option to give up," says 
Stiffarm, who recently returned to the reservation after 
teaching and conducting research at UCLA and Stanford in 
California. Stiffarm is among the growing number of educated 
Indians working for a tribal government in Montana. Her 
attitude is typical of Indian leaders today. 
One tool the Assiniboine and Gros Ventre tribes are 
implementing to help overcome their problems is education. 
Stiffarm says programs designed to teach the cultures of her 
people while helping them ease into the modern world have 
begun. If the two tribes are to survive, she says, they need 
to develop their human resources — but in a way that won't 
sacrifice cultural identities. 
She recalls the story of her father, who attended a 
BIA boarding school in the early part of this century; he 
and other young Indians were beaten if they spoke their 
native language. Such is not the philosophy of Indian 
education anymore. Two educational programs at Fort Belknap 
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— a computer-assisted development project and a national 
computer training clearinghouse — are new and they provide 
hope that the Assiniboine and Gros Ventre tribes will move 
closer to their educational goals. Both programs feature 
Apple computers and are designed for use in the schools. 
The computer-assisted development project was 
implemented in 1986 at the nearby Harlem junior and senior 
high schools. It teaches native languages and customs by 
using software developed specifically for the Gros Ventre 
and Assiniboine by the tribal education office, says Preston 
Stiffarm, a Harlem teacher and Fort Belknap tribal member 
who supervises the program.12 
The software features old-time stories and legends 
along with computer illustrations from each of the tribe's 
past. It is understood that Indians perform much better in 
school if they clearly understand their ethnic identity. 
Further, what's being done for the Gros Ventre is also done 
for the Assiniboine, an action taken to ease tension between 
the two tribes, once enemies. 
The other program, the National Computer Training 
Clearinghouse, offers instruction for Indian teachers from 
throughout the West. Modesto Rosales Jr., a University of 
Montana computer science graduate, says he helps teachers 
learn how to introduce computers into their curricula.13 
Rosales has also been working with tribal government staff 
to improve their commuter skills. Too many Indians are using 
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computers as nothing more than "glorified word processors" 
and not using them to their full potential, he says. 
In the realm of business development, tribal planner 
Bill Walls says he believes the timing may be right for some 
positive change on the Fort Belknap Reservation.1^ 
But he says, "we are running out of chances." 
Recognizing that the days of relatively abundant sources of 
federal money are gone, he says his people better get 
something started soon. "Federal money is drying up. We have 
to put on our business hats." 
While the Assiniboine and Gros Ventre tribes are 
making strides in self-determination policy — the 
government is getting more sophisticated, for example — 
former four-year tribal chairman and current BIA official 
Jack Plumage says problems remain.1^ As is the case 
elsewhere, tribal government has been highly unstable, with 
a new tribal chairman every two years. 
"Hell, it takes you that long just to find where the 
bathroom is," according to Plumage. 
Planning efforts have also been hampered by too many 
"crises," he says, adding that each new chairman tends to 
have a different set of priorities. And while the 
Assiniboine and Gros Ventre, once bitter rivals, have lived 
on the same reservation in peace for a century, there 
remains a clear distinction between the two tribes. 
Political divisions stem from these cultural roots, as each 
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tribe elects an equal number of representatives to the 
governing council. 
Because of these and other problems, Walls and 
others have called for the establishment of an apolitical 
development corporation to be established in 1987. It is 
designed to eliminate political or unprofessional actions 
from the tribes' business activities. Other tribes in 
Montana have established similar organizations. 
The corporation will be an arm of the community 
council, but it will be staffed with the tribes' best 
business experts. It is hoped the community council will 
give the new corporation a significant degree of autonomy so 
that it can make decisions in an efficient manner.1® The 
first goal of the new corporation will be to fill an empty 
but renovated 38,000-square-foot industrial building with 
something similar to what the Fort Peck Reservation has done 
with its A&S Industries.1^ The Fort Peck venture, which 
makes netting and medical chests for the U.S. armed 
services, employs up to 500 people, mostly tribal members. 
To accomplish this goal, the Assiniboine and Gros 
Ventre are working with a North Dakota State University 
professor to figure out ways to match military contracts 
with the Fort Belknap Reservation and an outside corporation 
to provide management and capital. A large potential work 
force, tax incentives, a community college, and a vocational 
program are being used to promote Fort Belknap.1® 
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However, agriculture is seen by the present tribal 
chairman as the reservation's best long-term economic bet. 
"We're in an agriculture region, and we ought to be looking 
at agriculture," says William T. "Snuffy" Main, who was 
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elected tribal chairman in 1986. 
Similar advice has been given in BIA-sponsored 
reports, which see a potential for more than 100,000 acres 
o r\ 
of irrigated farmland. u These lands could support a variety 
of crops including alfalfa, winter and spring wheat, oats, 
barley, flax, mustard, hay, beans, safflower, potatoes, 
J 1 
sugarbeets, as well as hogs, cattle, and sheep. -L Yet those 
same reports recognize the extreme weather conditions — the 
cold winters, short growing season, lack of precipitation — 
and say irrigation would be necessary and costly.22 
The community council has given Bigby the task of 
revamping a tribal farming venture that is, like its 
counterpart at Rocky Boy's, a financial drain. Bigby says 
the farm, at five years old, suffered from poor management 
and irresponsible fiscal policies, along with other problems 
inherent to agriculture. But due to good weather and a 
change in personnel, the farm was expected to show its first 
profit ever in 1986. 
Called Milk River Farms, it is a 640-acre irrigated 
project with 337 acres in winter wheat, spring wheat and 
oats, five acres of potatoes, 125 acres of grass hay, and 
173 acres of pasture. 
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Its future "can only be limited by the imagination," 
according to Bigby. For example, his vision — and it's a 
vision unclouded by the current farm and ranch crisis in 
Montana — includes a herd of 6,000 cattle, 10,000 acres of 
irrigated cropland, 50,000 acres of dry-land farming, and 
the establishment of a grain alcohol/feedlot enterprise. But 
if the tribes do follow Bigby's plans, they will have to 
tackle their controversial nature. Many tribal members run 
their own farms and see the tribal venture as potential 
competition. These people have had a different philosophy 
toward agriculture, preferring individual farms rather than 
a large cooperative agricultural venture. 
The collapse in 1986 of a proposal to purchase an 
8,000-acre irrigated farm and ranch along the Milk River 
illustrates the problems faced by tribal ventures in 
agriculture.2^ The BIA agreed to lend the tribes $1.5 
million for a downpayment on the farming enterprise, which 
is located along Highway 2. But, the project fell through 
after the community council put the question up to a vote of 
tribal members. It was defeated in a special election. 
If the tribes were to ever launch a massive 
agricultural development, the complicated issue of water 
rights would have to be settled. The Assiniboine and Gros 
Ventre tribes have long recognized the importance of water, 
and to their credit they have one of the nation's most 
significant water rulings backing them up.2^ Shortly after 
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the turn of the century, the federal government went to 
court on behalf of the tribes to secure their right to a 
significant portion of the Milk River, which flows across 
the northern portion of the reservation. In the landmark 
1908 decision that became known as the "Winters Doctrine," 
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the tribes had a special 
right to water from the Milk River. ° 
The Supreme Court established the concept of a 
federal reserved water right, and said that since the 
Indians had been first in time, they therefore had the first 
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right to use the water for present and future uses. Yet 
despite this powerful ally, the water issue along the Milk 
River Valley remains terribly complex and controversial. The 
BIA's Greg Smitman estimates that the Milk River is over-
allocated by 400 percent, and People's Creek, which flows 
from the Bear Paw Mountains across the reservation, is over-
allocated by 300 percent. There's enough water for everyone 
in a wet year like 1986, but not during a drought. 
Given the myriad of problems the Belknap Indians 
face — water shortages, lack of resources, barren land, 
little money, political turmoil, and declining federal aid -
- it remains to be seen whether the Assiniboine and Gros 
Ventre will be able to meet their goals of self-
determination and self-sufficiency. 
Yet it seems that these tribes, like their neighbors 
on Rocky Boy's Reservation, illustrate the need for 
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widespread education and vocational training. To that end, 
Plumage says progress is being made. He sees more of the 
reservation's young people coming home after college to 
apply their skills on behalf of the tribes. Still, too often 
they stay away, leaving the lesser-educated tribal members 
with the job of getting ready for the 21st century. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE NORTHERN CHEYENNE INDIAN RESERVATION 
Isolation, energy slump, and political turmoi1 
in land of Morning Star people 
Harvard-educated Joe Little Coyote, an outspoken 
Northern Cheyenne leader, says he's never seen his people in 
such poor economic and political shape.1 
After 16 years under the steady tribal chairmanship 
of Allan Rowland, who retired in 1984 and died a short time 
later, tribal government is in a state of disarray. The two 
subsequent tribal chairmen were removed from office, and the 
tribal court barred the man elected in late 1986, Robert 
Bailey, from taking office pending a legal challenge by his 
predecessor, who was ousted by the tribal council on charges 
of corruption. 
"Investors don't want to touch us with a ten-foot 
pole because we're so damn unstable," says Little Coyote, 
who was an unsuccessful candidate for the tribal chairman's 
position in the most recent election. 
The economy of the Northern Cheyenne Reservation, 
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with a resident population of about 3,100 tribal members who 
call themselves the Morning Star people, has taken a sharp 
turn for the worse in the 1980s — from the hope of oil and 
gas riches to the despair of having to rely almost entirely 
upon the federal government in an era of big budget cuts. 
Unemployment has steadily increased, from 34 percent 
in 1979 to more than 60 percent in 1986. Tribal revenues 
have dropped from several million dollars a year just three 
years ago, to an estimated $500,000 for 1987, primarily 
because ARCO canceled an oil and gas lease agreement with 
the tribe two years ago after failing to find any 
significant petroleum reserves under the 444,157-acre 
"5 
reservation.J 
The tribe is going broke, says Little Coyote, a 
former tribal official who helped negotiate that ARCO deal 
and was in charge of the tribal oil and gas office. Little 
Coyote now presides over a $1.2 million independent 
development fund established through the assistance of the 
St. Labre Catholic Mission at Ashland. 
The sad part about it, he says, is that tribal 
government has put forth little effort to generate any 
economic development. Government has instead been too busy 
dealing with its own political turmoil. 
With no industry or manufacturing and little retail 
business or tourism, the Northern Cheyenne Reservation is 
primarly an agriculture- and resource-based society, 
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according to Bureau of Indian Affairs Natural Resource 
Officer Bill Watters.4 Given the tribe's current depressed 
conditions — politically, economically and socially — 
Watters doesn't see much change "for many years to come." 
Yet, despite today's gloomy picture, the Northern 
Cheyenne are considered a people with great economic 
potential, due to their natural resources.^ The reservation, 
Montana's second smallest, is endowed with range, forest, 
water, and coal reserves. And even though ARCO failed to 
find petroleum reserves large enough for development, future 
development by a smaller company isn't ruled out. 
Clearly, should the tribe ever decide to develop 
those resources at a time when their relative values are 
high, they stand to make a great deal of money. 
Coal is the most abundant. BIA Billings-area 
geologist Rick Stefanic estimates total reserves at 56 
billion tons, with 3.3 billion tons recoverable given 
today's technology and market conditions.® Virtually the 
entire reservation is underlain by coal, as is much of 
southeastern Montana and neighboring northeastern Wyoming. 
During the 1970s, with oil and gas prices high, a coal boom 
brought strip mines on three sides of the Northern Cheyenne 
Reservation, including one mine developed by the Northern 
Cheyenne's Indian neighbors, the Crow. 
However, the Northern Cheyenne, due to environ­
mental, social, and spiritual reasons, decided not to 
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develop their coal.7 Instead, they chose another course of 
action, one which may have been the smartest given the 
present recession in the coal industry. 
With strip mines starting up all around the Northern 
Cheyenne, and with projections of future coal-fired 
generating plants throughout the region, tribal leaders at 
the time believed that their culture would be threatened by 
the potential massive influx of whites and the new values 
these new people would bring. Drugs, alcohol, and 
materialism were feared. 
"We will be taught materialism. We will be taught 
that we can have anything at the touch of a button. We will 
be taught to take things for granted," said Tom Gardner, the 
Q 
tribal executive director, in 1974. "It could bring in bad 
traits — drug traffic, mugging and discrimination. We will 
be a minority on our own reservation," he predicted. 
Meanwhile, the Crow Reservation to the west was 
eagerly developing its coal, but under different 
circumstances. Crow coal was being strip mined off their 
reservation, on land that had been ceded to the federal 
government decades ago. The Crow had retained mineral rights 
to the area. 
The Northern Cheyenne planned a different strategy, 
one that would not only preclude strip mining on their 
reservation but would give them some control over 
development that was taking place around them. The Northern 
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Cheyenne had the air over their reservation placed in the 
Class I category, the highest possible classification under 
federal standards. This classification is generally reserved 
for national parks and wilderness areas, although the 
Flathead and Fort Peck Indian reservations followed the 
Northern Cheyenne's lead and gained Class I air status. 
When Montana Power Co. (MPC) wanted to build two new 
electricity generating plants just north of the reservation 
at Colstrip, the tribe found themselves in a position to 
negotiate a settlement with MPC; in 1979, MPC agreed to 
provide Indians jobs, scholarships for tribal members, and 
pay for some of the social costs associated with the local 
g 
growth in population. The Northern Cheyenne, in turn, 
agreed to stop holding up construction of the 700-megawatt 
Colstrip units 3 and 4, which had threatened the 
reservation's air quality status.1® As a result, MPC has 
become one of the major Indian employers in southeastern 
Montana. 
At the end of 1985, 94 of the 635 MPC employees at 
Colstrip were Northern Cheyenne Indians, says Dennis 
Limberhand, special projects coordinator for MPC who also 
serves on the Montana Human Rights Commission.11 Another 12 
Northern Cheyenne were working for MPC subcontractors, says 
Limberhand, a Northern Cheyenne tribal member who has the 
difficult job of smoothing relations between his people and 
MPC. 
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During the construction phase of the two new units, 
known as Colstrip 3 and Colstrip 4, as many as 200 Northern 
Cheyenne were employed out of a workforce of 2,000. "We have 
Cheyennes in all areas now," he says, adding that some have 
become shift supervisors and journeyman plant operators. 
"You don't conquer this industry over night." 
One positive result of the MPC development, 
according to Limberhand, has been a change in attitude among 
many Northern Cheyenne, who have typically made a living by 
part-time or seasonal work with the BIA or U.S. Forest 
Service on fire, road, or trail crews. He believes Northern 
Cheyenne Indians who hold down jobs at Colstrip may be 
setting an example for younger tribal members. 
"The work ethic is just catching on," he says, 
adding: "Our generation is really the first-generation of 
lunch-packers." 
While strip mining was not acceptable to tribal 
members, oil and gas development was considered a viable 
economic alternative because they perceived it to be less 
environmentally degrading, according to Little Coyote. 
Negotiations between the tribe and ARCO led to a lease which 
spanned 33 years, provided the tribe with a $6 million in 
up-front bonus payments, and added a number of other 
provisions. Some of those were: 
— a committment by ARCO that it would spend a 
minimum of $20 million in exploration over the first six 
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years of the contract. 
— a tribal royalty rate of 25 percent. 
— a minimum of $1 million in annual lease payments, 
with higher lease payments on lands which become 
1 9 
productive. -L^ 
Tribal and BIA hopes were high that significant 
reserves of oil or gas would be found. A 1980 draft 
environmental impact statement predicted up to 5 million 
barrels of oil and 20 billion to 30 billion cubic feet of 
natural gas.13 
Seven wells were drilled. But ARCO pulled out after 
the third year of the agreement, exercising a right it had 
under a special provision of the contract.14 Not all tests 
were negative, according to Watters. But he says ARCO 
decided there wasn't enough oil or gas to make commercial 
development feasible. There's hope that a smaller company 
will some day return to the reservation when market 
conditions improve. 
Today, the Northern Cheyenne are looking to their 
timber resources as a potential revenue producer.1^ In 1986, 
the tribe was negotiating the purchase of a lumber mill at 
Ashland, with the assistance of the economic development 
fund administered by Little Coyote and the St. Labre 
Mission. Northern Cheyenne Industries, an economic 
development arm of tribal government, has been involved in 
negotiations that seek to get the mill under Indian control. 
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If the Northern Cheyenne succeed, an estimated 100 Indian 
jobs would be created.1® 
The mill could tap timber supplies from around the 
region, including an allowable cut of 10 million board feet 
annually from the Northern Cheyenne Reservation alone.17 
Other timber could come from the Crow Reservation to the 
west, the Custer National Forest to the east, or nearby 
private sources. Watters estimates the Northern Cheyenne 
have the potential to run 15 million to 18 million board 
feet per year through the Ashland mill. 
Range resources are currently providing the bulk of 
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the tribe's annual revenue through a leasing program. ° Of a 
total 444,775 acres on the reservation, 400,000 are 
considered range. A recent BIA range survey found that the 
I Q 
conditions were good, despite recent drought years. 
To coordinate the reservation's variety of 
resources, the BIA is drafting a new integrated management 
plan that will be a prototype for Indian reservations around 
the West, according to Norris "Mack" Cole, Billings-Area BIA 
assistant director.2® "We've got a lot of data," Cole says, 
"but it is stored in different places and is not easily 
accessible." 
The plan, scheduled to be completed in 1987, will be 
computerized and flexible to allow resource planners to look 
at how various management scenerios will effect such 
resources as water, range, wildlife, and timber. It should 
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help the Northern Cheyenne develop solid, long-term resource 
management plans — something that has been missing on this 
and other reservations, Cole says. 
While Cole and Watters see natural resources as an 
essential building block to an economic development plan, 
the BIA's Sharon Limberhand points out that the 
reservation's remote location presents a major impediment to 
growth.21 U.S. Highway 212 crosses the reservation on its 
route from Interstate 90 through the Crow Reservation, Lame 
Deer, Ashland, the Custer National Forest, and Alzada. But 
the road from Crow Agency to Ashland is narrow, winding, and 
hilly. Lame Deer, a town of two gas sations, four cafes, a 
grocery store, and a small lumber mill, is about an hour's 
drive from Interstate 90 and two hours from Billings. Rapid 
City is up to five hours away. 
Other problems exist, and they contribute to a mood 
of frustration and despair. There's no high school at Lame 
Deer. Children attend either the Catholic school 25 miles 
north at Colstrip or 25 miles east at the St. Labre Catholic 
Mission in Ashland. Health care is limited. A clinic 
provides some emergency services, but the nearest hospital 
is at Crow Agency, 45 miles west. 
Even the mood at the Dull Knife Community College, 
one the the nation's first Indian community colleges, is 
depressed. Admissions Director Bill Wertman, recognizing the 
goal of meshing community college curricula with tribal 
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economic development plans, notes that "there just isn't a 
lot of economic development going on here."22 A major focus 
of the community college is educating the community on the 
problems with alcohol abuse, a disease affecting 95 percent 
of the families here, according to Wertman. 
In societies where educated Indians say their 
knowledge brings discrimination upon themselves from their 
own people, community colleges can provide a vital bridge 
between the Indian community and its youth by becoming a 
center of education, culture, and recreation. Further, 
Wertman believes Indian youths have a hard time finding 
positive role models in communities suffering from chronic 
alcoholism, and community colleges can meet that need. But 
staffing at the college in 1986 was down 25 percent from 
1985 due to budget cuts, and students are finding it more 
difficult to obtain financial aid.23 
All these issues lead Sharon Limberhand to assess 
the present status of the Northern Cheyenne in negative 
terms: "It's a pretty bad situation." 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE CROW INDIAN RESERVATION 
Self-government tops priority 1ist 
on state's largest reservation 
Crow leaders face a major challenge: starting from 
scratch to set up a government that can lead their people 
toward economic self-sufficiency and political self-
determination. They've tried it before; this time, they hope 
they can make it work. 
In 1980, the Bureau of Indian Affairs took over the 
Crow's day-to-day governmental operations after a federal 
audit found widespread mismanagement of money and what BIA 
Billings-Area Director Richard Whitesell called "politics 
run amuck.A federal BIA employee was placed in the top 
tribal government management position to direct the Crow 
down a path of fiscal and political responsibility. 
Last August, in a much heralded ceremony, federal 
officials literally returned the keys of the tribal office 
back to a new Crow government. Current BIA policy, Whitesell 
says, dictates that tribes must be allowed to fail, as well 
92 
as succeed, if they are to ever break from the paternalistic 
grips of the federal government. Returning Crow government 
to the Crow people is an example of that policy. 
The new Crow government is making their first order 
of business the establishment of credible accounting, 
O 
record-keeping, and procurement procedures.'6 "All this is 
non-existent at this time," according to tribal Chairman 
Richard Real Bird. "Before we can go into business, these 
systems need to be in place." Once the new systems are 
working, Real Bird hopes that the Crow can begin to change 
the immense social and economic problems felt by his people, 
people he says "want progress, but are afraid of change." 
As they are on other Montana reservations, 
unemployment, poverty and alcoholism on the Crow Reservation 
are pervasive. The tribe's economy, based on mining, timber, 
agriculture, and federal aid, is suffering terribly. Tribal 
income, mostly from coal royalties, has been as high as $8 
million a year during the past decade, but dropped to about 
$3 million in 1986.3 If the energy market continues its 
slump, tribal income is expected to drop even farther. 
Planner Leonard Bends predicted the annual Crow budget will 
fall to under $1 million a year by the end of the decade. 
Unemployment has risen steadily since 1980. Census 
figures showed 35 percent unemployment six years ago.^ The 
following year, that rate had worsened to 44 percent.^ 
Tribal officials say unemployment now stands at least 80 
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percent.^ The situation was at its worst in the winter of 
1985-1986, when unemployment peaked at 93 percent, with 97 
percent of all households receiving some form of general 
assistance or welfare, according to Real Bird. 
Real Bird hopes that his people can put their 
reputation for irresponsibility and political confusion 
behind them. To establish credibility, he has hired two Crow 
leaders with extensive backgrounds in financial management. 
Barney Old Coyote, a former president of the American Indian 
National Bank in Washington, D.C., has taken over as tribal 
manager. And John Old Elk, an accountant and financial 
manager with energy company experience, is the new financial 
director for the tribe. 
According to Old Elk, "We're drawing a line from 
July 1 (1986) and going forward." The immediate task for 
Old Elk and Old Coyote is to get the tribe's accounting 
system certified. This task includes such basic tasks as 
paying old bills, Old Elk says, to prevent such services as 
power or telephone from being cut off. The previous 
government — even with a federal manager in place — let 
too many bills go unpaid, as tribal revenues dried up, 
according to Old Elk. 
Old Elk hopes to bring a corporate perspective to 
tribal government. He says he wants to create a framework 
whereby tribal members see themselves as corporate 
shareholders, and their elected leaders as executive 
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officers. However, while tribal leaders like Old Elk and 
Real Bird speak in terms of running tribal government like a 
business, the political system they must work within remains 
far removed from the model of a successful corporation. 
One of the problems stems from the Crow holding 
tight to a part of their heritage. As a people, the Crow 
have been relatively successful at maintaining their Indian 
identities, traditional values, and native language. But 
they also retained a form of government that, while it may 
be as close to pure democracy as possible, has been highly 
O 
criticized for being inefficient. The Crow are governed by 
a "general council" composed of all tribal men over 21 years 
old and women over 18. Each has a vote in the council, which 
meets four times a year to set policy for the tribe's four 
elected officers. 
Real Bird, who says he has no plans to seek a change 
in this form of government, admits that this "grassroots 
democracy" has created problems. It has not allowed for 
long-term planning, which is considered essential for 
economic development. The tribe frequently splits over key 
issues, he says, and lets politics get in the way of 
efficient decision making. 
Tribal planner Leonard Bends, whose speciality is 
economic development, believes the system eventually will 
change. The tribe is too large, he says, and the system is 
too cumbersome to mesh with the modern, outside business 
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world. Bends, like his counterparts on other Montana 
reservations, says there is no way the Crow can have 
economic development unless politics is removed from tribal 
business activities. Unfortunately, separating politics from 
business is impossible now. 
"We fumble a lot," Bends says, adding, "when we 
fumble, we have to wait three months to correct the fumble." 
However, Bends says it would be political suicide 
for a tribal chairman to suggest a change in government 
structure. Any chairman who did would find himself "thrown 
off the reservation," Bends says. Indeed, the Crow have a 
reputation for removing tribal chairmen before their terms 
expire. 
Bends takes an optimistic look at Real Bird and his 
goal to work within the system. "If anybody can do it, he 
can," Bends says, praising Real Bird's determination to 
revitalize a system of committees to handle a variety of 
tribal affairs and to provide a link between the 
administrative officers and the general council. That link 
can smooth potentially rough political waters, he says. 
Bends also praises Real Bird for bucking a previous 
tribal government trend to ignore college-educated Indians 
for government positions. Bends, who worked for the previous 
administration, says it used to be that people with college 
degrees were shunned and couldn't find a place within tribal 
government. 
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Bends remembers returning from Eastern Montana 
College several years ago and being challenged by a tribal 
elder who told him that he didn't belong on the reservation 
because he had a college degree. He was told that college-
educated Indians can find work off the reservation, so 
that's where they should go; tribal jobs should go to the 
un-educated, unemployed, because they need the jobs. 
If the basic government reforms can be made, the 
tribal administration can look to the Crow's vast natural 
resources for the basic economic building blocks needed to 
build a viable economy. "The Crow tribe is blessed with an 
abundance of natural resources. We've got over 50 billion 
tons of coal, we also have water, we have oil and gas, and 
we have land. We have everything necessary to be self-
sufficient," Real Bird says. 
The Crow Reservation is Montana's largest. It covers 
more than 2.2 million acres, with the tribal membership of 
about 7,000 controlling about 68 percent of the land; non-
Indians control remaining lands. The Crow have mineral 
rights to another million acres under land north of the 
reservation to the Yellowstone River. And it is in this area 
— at Westmoreland Resources, Inc.'s Absaloka Mine — where 
Montana's only Indian coal is being developed. 
The mining tract, covering about 15,000 acres, has 
recoverable reserves of about 600 million tons and has been 
the major source of revenue — more than $21 million in 
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royalties — for the tribe since the first train load of 
Q 
coal was shipped out in 1974. 
But the mine has been in trouble, according to 
Westmoreland Resources General Manager David Simpson.1® He 
notes that the tribe has earned significant revenue from the 
mine and says it has provided Indian employment beyond 
tribal- or federal-government payrolls. But the current 
energy slump has taken its toll on Westmoreland Resources 
and the Crow. Further, the mine has not lived up to 
expectations. 
"The people of the Crow Nation view coal as the 
black gold that will transform welfare recipients into 
capitalists," according to a Billings Gazette special 
publication in 1974.Crow Minerals Committee member Eloise 
Pease was quoted at the time as saying: "We're tired of 
handouts. We would like to exploit our own wealth for a 
1 9 
change."x 
The article was up-beat, saying that coal was the 
way for the tribe to reduce its 29 percent unemployment 
rate. But instead of dropping, the unemployment rate on the 
reservation has actually risen in the years since coal 
development began. Instead of the Absaloka Mine producing 
the anticipated 15 million tons per year, production peaked 
in 1979 at 5 million tons, and it had leveled off to about 2 
million tons in 1986.13 Employment at the mine has declined 
to about 25 workers, down from an average of 60 to 80 in the 
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late 1970s and early 1980s.^ About half those are Crow 
Indians.^ 
Building a coal-fired generating plant was once 
considered an appealing tribal option and could have 
employed hundreds of Crow Indians, but Class I air quality 
status on the neighboring Northern Cheyenne Reservation has 
cast a political cloud on that issue. The current depressed 
price of coal has amplified problems. Now, Real Bird says 
the tribe is looking at a possible joint venture with 
another Indian tribe. Crow coal could be shipped to the 
other reservation, where a generating plant could convert it 
to electricity. This plan would, no doubt, be controversial. 
The Crow also had hoped to develop a second coal 
mine, this one with Shell Oil Co., but Shell pulled out in 
1985, blaming the sagging conditions of the energy industry, 
conditions that make new coal development in Montana 
unlikely at present. 
According to Simpson, coal companies' problems in 
Montana are complex. They are tied to the world price of 
oil, the quality and quantity of coal, the cost of mining, 
and the cost to transport coal to market. One issue that has 
been hotly debated is whether Montana's severance tax should 
apply to Crow coal. The Crow tribe maintains that its coal, 
held in trust for the tribe by the federal government, falls 
outside of state jurisdiction and should therefore not be 
subject to state taxation.1® Meanwhile, the state claims 
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that Crow coal is like any other private coal reserves and, 
as a consequence, it should be taxed. A federal judge has 
sided with the state, but that ruling was appealed by the 
Crow Tribe. Regardless of the outcome, the issue is expected 
to end up in the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Nevertheless, Crow coal will continue to be a part 
of the reservation's economy for years to come. Total 
recoverable reserves are estimated at 600 million tons. "At 
the rate we're going, it will take a long time to deplete 
the lease," according to Simpson. 
One thing is for certain, according to Real Bird. 
Future coal development will most likely involve a joint 
venture instead of a lease agreement. Joint ventures were 
allowed for the first time with the passage of the 1982 
Indian Mineral Leasing and Development Act. This act has 
been successfully employed in oil and gas development by the 
tribes of the Fort Peck and Blackfeet reservations. 
Besides coal development, the Crow have been 
directing their economic development activities toward 
several other areas: 
— Winning a $60 million to $100 million settlement 
from the federal government over an alleged surveying error 
that denied the Crow about 36,000 coal-rich acres. The Crow 
hired former Secretary of Interior James Watt to represent 
them, but they recently terminated their contract with Watt. 
The case is still pending in court.17 
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— A small hydro-electric plant on the Big Horn 
River below Yellowtail Dam is being investigated. Details 
are being studied with state and federal officials. If the 
project wins approval, it could provide construction jobs 
and long-term employment, plus annual revenues from the sale 
1 ft 
of power. 
— Sun Lodge, a run-down motel along 1-90 near Crow 
1 9 Agency, is being renovated. The lodge is located near the 
Custer Battlefield, where the Northern Cheyenne and Sioux 
teamed up with various other bands to deliver the U.S. 
Cavalry its most famous defeat. 
— A business such as the Fort Peck tribes' A&S 
Industries, which capitalizes on military support contracts, 
is being sought for a 105,000-square-feet building that once 
o ft 
housed a carpet mill. The Crow are working with a North 
Dakota State University professor to match their reservation 
with a company and product to be manufactured or assembled 
on their reservation. 
— A small shopping mall, owned and operated by the 
0 1 
tribe, is also being considered for Crow Agency. •L Most Crow 
shop off the reservation in Hardin or Billings, and as a 
result, money brought into the reservation leaves almost 
immediately, a problem common with most Montana 
reservations. 
While the above projects are seen as having 
potential benefits for the Crow, tribal planner Bends 
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doesn't see any immediate way out out his people's problems. 
"There is no quick solution," he says, making this 
prediction: "It's going to take five or six years to turn it 
around." Given this reservation's track record, Bends may be 
overly optimistic; merely reaching the top Crow goal of 
fiscal responsibility will be a significant achievement. 
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PART TWO 
THE CONFEDERATED SALISH AND KOOTENAI TRIBES 
THE WESTERN MONTANA'S FLATHEAD INDIAN RESERVATION 
CHAPTER ONE 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE FLATHEAD INDIAN RESERVATION 
Salish and Kootenai 
find that resources, location 
give them an advantage 
Confederated Salish and Kootenai tribal officials 
acknowledge that, compared with other Indian reservations in 
America, their's is among the most blessed. Tribal vice-
chairman Ron Therriault says he's quick to recognize that 
fact every time he visits another reservation in Montana or 
elsewhere in the West.1 
While many reservations are on land that includes 
the poorest in the country, the Confederated Salish and 
Kootenai Tribes occupy a scenic, 1.2-million acre tract of 
western Montana that ranges from fertile agricultural land 
in the valley to commercial-grade forests to mountains, 
glaciers and high-mountain lakes. 
Since the reservation was created in 1855, but 
mostly since the 1975 Indian Education and Self 
Determination Act, the Flathead people have been getting 
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better and better at turning their natural resources into 
valuable economic assets. They have also become a leading 
voice for environmental protection. 
The Salish and Kootenai have one of the better 
tribal economies in the nation, and they find themselves 
best off, economically, of all seven Montana Indian 
reservations. They play a central role in shaping the 
economic and political future of a significant portion of 
Montana: that portion of the state between Kalispell and 
Missoula. And Indian leaders' presence can be felt in both 
Missoula and Kalispell. 
The Salish and Kootenai tribal government is the 
largest employer in Lake County, accounting for about 500 
jobs.2 The tribal budget, business enterprises, and salaries 
boost the local economy by at least $20 million annually, 
Therriault says. Indians own more than 150 private 
businesses on the reservation, about half of those are farms 
or ranches.3 
Pointing to the tribes' economic contribution to the 
Valley, Therriault says, "We are not bad neighbors at all." 
Unemployment on the Flathead Reservation is about 27 
percent, compared with a range of 40 percent to 85 percent 
on other Montana reservations.^ All other Montana Indian 
reservations have suffered sharp drops in tribal revenues, 
due to crashes in energy, agricultural or timber markets, 
but the Flathead's have actually risen.^ 
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The Flathead tribes brought in $12.5 million in 
1985, thanks primarly to a 1984 rent settlement between 
Montana Power Co. (MPC) and the tribes over the 180-megawatt 
Kerr Dam near Poison.^ Similar annual income projections are 
anticipated for the near future, as the tribes can expect an 
MPC rent payment of about $9 million (adjusted to inflation) 
each year through 2015. 
By comparison, the annual tribal revenues on the 
Rocky Boy's, Fort Belknap, and Northern Cheyenne 
reservations are all under $500,000.7 The Blackfeet, Crow, 
and Fort Peck Indians are all able to raise seven-digit 
incomes off their natural resources, but their combined 
Q 
incomes in 1985 only matched the Flathead's $12.5 million.0 
On the Flathead Reservation, the economy is not 
based on the volatile boom-and-bust nature of the petroleum 
or coal industries. Recreation, tourism, timber, clean 
industry, and hydroelectric power are viewed as the 
essential building blocks to stable, long-term economic 
growth and the realization of self-determination. 
The reservation stretches about 60 miles southward 
from the middle of Flathead Lake to about 15 miles north of 
Missoula, and about 40 miles westward from the crest of the 
Mission Mountains to the Lolo National Forest boundary. 
Indians own or control about half of the reservation's total 
land area. Most of that is the tribes' 540,000 acres of 
forest land, 300,000 acres of which are considered by tribal 
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government to be of commercial value. 
Wet by Montana standards, the Flathead Reservation 
offers a sharp contrast to eastern Montana Indian 
reservations, where annual precipitation is generally under 
15 inches. On the Flathead, annual precipitation ranges from 
a low of 15 inches in the Hot Springs area to 20 inches at 
Poison and Ronan to more than 100 inches in the Mission 
Mountains.1® One major river, the Flathead, and two smaller 
rivers, the Little Bitterroot and the Jocko, flow through 
the reservation and contribute to more than 460 miles of 
reservation streams.11 Approximately 60,000 surface acres 
1 ? 
(about half) of Flathead Lake lies within the reservation." 
The tribes also manage a 90,000-acre high-mountain 
wilderness area which is home to native trout, deer, elk and 
at least four endangered or threatened wildlife species: 
grizzly bears, peregrine falcons, bald eagles, and wolves.13 & 
While most of the best agricultural land on the 
reservation is owned by whites, about 20,000 acres of 
Indian-owned land (both individual and tribal trust) is 
farmed, producing a variety of crops including alfalfa, 
wheat, barley, and silage corn.1^ The Mission Valley is some 
of the richest land in Montana. 
The area is also a major tourism and recreational 
attraction to local, regional, and national visitors who 
come to hunt waterfowl on the reservation, hike on 
wilderness trails, fish its waters, spend time at Flathead 
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Lake, visit the National Bison Range, or explore nearby 
Glacier National Park. To its advantage, the reservation is 
located on Highway 93, the link between Missoula and 
Kalispell, and one of the major routes between Yellowstone 
and Glacier national parks. Of the 2.5 million visitors who 
come to Montana each year, 60 percent, or about 1.5 million, 
visit Glacier Park, bringing many of those to the 
reservation.^ 
In comparison to all other Montana tribes, with the 
possible exception of Fort Peck's Assiniboine and Sioux, the 
Salish and Kootenai are clearly off to the best start in the 
struggle toward self determination. Tribal officials say 
that this is due to several reasons: less isolation, a 
tribal population with more formal education, and more than 
a century of living in close proximity to the dominant white 
society. But at the top of their list is the relative 
abundance of natural resources, resources which have 
provided the tribes with the largest and most stable revenue 
base of all Montana Indians. 
"We are not absolutely dependent upon the federal 
government, a fact that many non-Indians refuse to believe," 
says Jim Paro, the former tribal Natural Resources 
Department director who resigned from his position in early 
1987 to become manager of S&K Electronics, a tribal 
electronics firm.1® 
Outnumbered by whites by a ratio of four to one, the 
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Salish and Kootenai have found that survival presents a 
continuing struggle — politically, economically, legally, 
and culturally — between themselves and the dominant 
society. They've lost much in the 132 years since their 
forefathers signed the Treaty of Hell Gate at what would 
become Missoula; their reservation once encompassed most of 
western Montana, from Canada to Idaho. What's left is only 
half under their control, a result of federal policies in 
the early 1900s that opened the reservation to white 
settlement. 
But the Salish and Kootenai are making a comeback. 
And they are doing so by gaining control of key natural 
resources, applying management, and adopting environmental 
policies that preclude rapid population growth, industrial 
development or, resource exploitation. 
The tribes' resource base — timber, water, fish and 
wildlife, clean air, wilderness — is for the most part 
renewable, provided management is sound. It is these 
resources, set in the context of preserving a relatively 
pristine native homeland, which have become the driving 
factor behind the Flathead goal of economic self-sufficiency 
and political self-determination. 
Promotional material distributed by the tribes 
includes a statement that the Salish and Kootenai are 
following the philosophy of Cherokee Chief Doublehead who 
said almost 200 years ago: "If we hold our lands, there will 
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always be a turkey, or deer, or fish in the streams, for 
those young who come after us."17 
To this end, tribal govenment has, in recent years, 
declared their reservation a nuclear-free zone, adopted the 
highest air quality standards possible under federal law, 
regulated the transport of hazardous materials, regulated 
the shoreline of that portion of Flathead which lies within 
the exterior boundaries of the reservation, established a 
90.000-acre wilderness, assumed control of fish and game 
management, and pst-.ahlishpH an agiiaJH lands and streambed 
protection ordinance. 
"People say if you do these things (environmental 
protection), you can't grow," says Therriault, adding, 
"Well, maybe you can't grow as an industrial power, but we 
don't necessarily want to grow as an industrial power." 
Therriault, who frequently speaks to non-Indian 
audiences on behalf of the tribes, rarely makes a public 
appearance without taking the opportunity to make a 
reference to environmental protection. 
"You've heard of Spaceship Earth," he says, "Well, 
this is Spaceship Res.," he adds, referring to the 
reservation. Saying his people cannot save the entire world 
from environmental destruction, he says they can commit 
themselves to preserving their corner of the world. 
The environmental ethic embraced by tribal 
government speaks to a spiritual necessity: an overriding 
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obligation that this generation has to the next, and to the 
land itself.18 But it also addresses the political realities 
of self-determination policy and the demographic realities 
of being a minority on his own reservation. It is, for 
example, to his people's advantage to limit the growth of 
the non-Indian population; whites on the reservation 
outnumber the Salish and Kootenai about 3,800 to 15,800, 
creating an inevitable confrontation between Indians and the 
dominant white society over the reservation's resources. 
Policies which limit large-scale development, that 
would prevent a rapid boom in population, will only help 
give the Salish and Kootenai more time to establish their 
government, as well as regain lost cultural ties. Tribal 
control of resources and environmental regulation helps the 
Salish and Kootenai people define their concept of a tribal 
homeland. 
At the same time, maintaining environmental quality 
on the reservation is seen by many, both Indians and non-
Indians alike, as perhaps the best long-term economic bet 
for the future. Non-exploitive use of the area's forests, 
waters, mountains, wetlands, farmlands, and wildlife could 
help this area to become a major recreation attraction.1^ 
Movin^^ahfi^d for the tribes is synonymous with 
establishiivg control oti that region of western Montana known 
as the Mission Valley.2® Control issues relating to water, 
recreation and wildlife will be discussed in subsequent 
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chapters. 
But unfortuntely, according to Therriault, moving 
ahead for the Salish and Kootenai means a confrontation with 
whites, who not only outnumber the Indians but also control 
or own most of the land in the valley bottoms and much of 
the prime shoreline real estate along the southern half of 
Flathead Lake. Therriault and others in tribal government 
say the confrontation is frustrating; whites want Indians to 
become self-sufficient, yet they oppose specific tribal 
actions that would help them achieve such a goal. 
With federal Indian aid decreasing this decade, the 
Flathead tribes have been forced into raising revenue for 
today's needs, as well as those needs in a future that will 
likely see a continued decrease in federal support. As are 
other Montana Indian tribes, the Flathead tribes are 
receiving an estimated 30 percent to 40 percent less federal 
money since 1980. 
The Salish and Kootenai, who manage dozens of 
programs once managed by the federal government, have seen 
federal assistance for those programs drop from $16.7 
million in 1981 to $10 million in 1987, says Jane Clairmont, 
tribal grants and contracts officer.22 These programs 
include water resource studies, law enforcement, education, 
tribal health, and economic development. The future, 
according to Clairmont, "is really scary." 
The need to raise more tribal funds to supplement 
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lost federal revenue has pushed the Salish and Kootenai to 
adopt a number of tribal ordinances that assume control of 
natural resources on the reservation, and which raise money 
to cover costs of resource management. But with each new 
ordinance, all adopted in the name of self-determination, 
and all assuming some degree of Indian authority over non-
Indians, comes a new wave of ojections raised by many of the 
non-tribal members living on the reservation. 
Lake County Commissioner Mike Hutchin, one of many 
whites living on the reservation who oppose the tribal 
system, finds it hard to believe the Salish and Kootenai 
have special rights from a 132-year-old treaty signed 
generations ago under completely different circumstances. J 
However, the Hell Gate Treaty of 1855 does, indeed, exist, 
and its provisions have been upheld in our nation's highest 
court. 
The result is that questions of jurisdictional 
control surround virtually all aspects of land and natural 
resource management on the reservation — questions such as 
who owns Flathead Lake, and who should manage it? Is there a 
difference between ownership of the surface of the lake and 
ownership of the water itself? How much water should be 
reserved for the Indians? Who should manage the local 
irrigation project and power cooperative, originally built 
for Indians but now serving mostly whites? How much water 
should be allocated to farmers and ranchers, and how much 
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should be left in the streams or rivers for fish and related 
aquatic resources? Who owns the fish and wildlife, and who 
should manage these resources? 
Is there any merit to Hutchin's claim that the 
reservation is becoming Montana's version of South Africa, 
where a minority rules over a majority, and where the 
majority has virtually no representation in government? 
Some of these questions have been answered by 
various courts, and, to date, judgements have generally 
favored the tribes. For example, the Salish and Kootenai do 
have the right to exclude non-tribal members from using 
their land, or hunting their wildlife, or fishing their 
waters.^ They also have the right to charge permits to non-
tribal members who want to use the reservation as a 
2 s 
recreational area, and they can set limits on its use. J 
The so-called "Namen Decision" ruled that the tribes 
have the right to regulate the bed and banks of their 
portion of Flathead Lake; they can set limits on the size of 
boathouses and docks, and can prohibit the manipulation of 
the shoreline.^® 
Other questions, such as who will manage aquatic 
lands and streambeds on the reservation, or who will manage 
the fish and game, are being debated, as the tribes have 
assumed responsibility for these resources in early 1987. 
Negotiations between state and tribal representatives are 
underway. If cooperative agreements can't be reached, court 
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court challenges will likely follow. 
The Salish and Kootenai people face more than just 
issues relating to natural resources and tribal 
jurisdiction. According to Paro, they eventually need to 
address the issue of continued blood quantum dilution due to 
decades of inter-racial marriages. They need to continue 
addressing the loss of Indian culture they've experienced. 
How long, one might ask, can the Salish and Kootenai people 
continue to maintain their dwindling cultural identity as 
they live as a minority in their own homeland, a homeland 
guaranteed to them? 
The Salish and Kootenai have been successful. But, 
as Therriault notes, that success has come at a tremendous 
cost: the near-loss of their native languages and cultural 
identity. To meet this challenge, cultural committees and 
the staff at the local community college are doing what they 
can to foster a rebirth in the tribes' traditions. 
Nonetheless, the tribes' find themselves open to criticism 
from people like County Commissioner Hutchin, who questions 
whether many of the Salish and Kootenai Indians are Indians 
at all. 
In fact, about 30 percent of tribal members have 
less than 1/4 Indian blood.^ Another 40 percent are between 
1/4 and 1/2 Indian blood, meaning that about 70 percent of 
the tribal membership have less than 1/2 Indian blood. 
Given these pressures, it's not surprising that 
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large-scale economic development, the kind that could bring 
a large influx of whites on the reservation, is not a tribal 
goal. For the same reasons, it is not surprising that the 
Flathead tribes' self-determination activities of the 1970s 
and 1980s, which clearly can be seen as survival tactics, 
provide an example by which other tribes may follow. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE NATURAL RESOURCES: 
WATER 
Water resources 
considered to be most valuable 
on reservation 
Water, especially Flathead Lake and River, is the 
Salish and Kootenai people's most important resource, says 
former Confederated Salish and Kootenai Natural Resource 
Department Director Jim Paro.* 
Even though questions of who owns the water, and who 
will have the right to regulate its use, have yet to be 
settled, the tribes derive significant monetary and non­
monetary benefits from the reservation's relatively abundant 
water resources. 
Water is the life-blood of the Salish and Kootenai 
Tribes' land: their forests, their range, their wildlife, 
and their fish. It has tremendous scenic value in the form 
of pristine high-mountain lakes, glaciers, waterfalls, 
streams, rivers, and wet-land marshes. 
The Salish and Kootenai can count 89 lakes on their 
reservation.^ The biggest is Flathead Lake, of which about 
60,000 acres, the southern half, is located within the 
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reservation's exterior boundaries. There are also more than 
460 miles of streams or rivers; the largest is the Flathead 
River, flowing south out of Flathead Lake through the middle 
of the reservation.^ It meets the Clark Fork River near 
Paradise at the reservation's southwest corner. 
Scenic, recreational, and ecological values of the 
reservation's water resources are difficult to measure. 
Consider subsistence deer hunting, for example. Water plays 
an essential role in supporting this activity, a year-round 
right to tribal members. Subsistence hunting puts a valuable 
commodity, meat, in the freezer, but subsistence hunting is 
also part of a traditional lifestyle many Indians hold as 
priceless.^ 
Water is also a cornerstone in the tribes' growing 
recreation and tourism efforts centered around Flathead 
Lake, Flathead River, Ninepipe and Pablo national wildlife 
ranges, the National Bison Range, and the Mission Mountain 
Tribal Wilderness. The value of abundant and clean water to 
plants and animals occupying these areas, and to human 
visitors, is virtually impossible to measure. 
However, the Salish and Kootenai Tribes believe that 
people will be willing to pay to use their lands and waters 
if they are maintained in a relatively pristine condition.*' 
Indeed, many people are already paying to swim in or 
waterski on Flathead Lake, to hunt waterfowl on the 
reservation's wetlands, to fish its waters, or hike in 
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wilderness drainages. Tribal regulations require all non-
members to buy a permit if they want to do any of these 
activities on tribal lands or waters. 
There are problems, though. Enforcement has been 
difficult. Wildland Recreation Department Director Herschel 
Mays says that not everyone knows he or she is supposed to 
buy a permit, and others who are familiar with the 
regulations choose to ignore them.^ But according to Mays, 
people have become more cooperative; in recent years, tribal 
government has been able to raise about $100,000 annually 
from permit sales, or twice as much than in 1979. 
Starting in 1987, the tribes hope to have a new 
permit system that will impose higher fees, carry a much 
broader jurisdiction and will be enforceable through civil 
actions in tribal court. Fish and Game Law Enforcement 
officer Frank Acevedo says up to $300,000 will be raised 
O 
each year under the new system.0 (These regulations, found 
in tribal ordinance 44-D, will be discussed in Chapter 5). 
Water is also important to farming and ranching. The 
Flathead Irrigation and Power Project (FIPP), operated by 
the federal government, provides irrigation to 2,600 
customers, about 90 percent non-Indian, and 127,000 acres of 
agricultural land within the reservation.^ FIPP has been the 
subject of great controversy in recent years, as the Salish 
and Kootenai are demanding that fish and aquatic resources 
be protected by the establishment of minimum in-stream flows 
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at the expense of irrigation needs. 
Actions centered around the power division of FIPP 
have also raised controversy. The Salish and Kootenai 
Tribes, through the "638" contracting provisions of the 
Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act, are 
currently trying to secure the authority to manage the power 
division of FIPP, which supplies electricity to about 20,000 
people living on the reservation. The tribes were given 
initial approval by the BIA in 1986, but that action has 
been challenged in court by opponents who object to Indian 
control over non-Indians. 
Small-scale hydropower is also being developed. A 
350-kilowatt dam on Boulder Creek in the northern Mission 
Mountains was recently built and financed by the tribes. 
Tribal economist Ron Trosper says the project is starting to 
make money.*® Other potential sites, such as Lower Crow 
Creek, Post Creek, Dry Creek and Mission, have been 
identified for their potential small-scale hydropower value, 
although their proximity to the tribal wilderness may cause 
management conflicts, and their economic potential is 
unknown.** 
Several potential hydropower facilities have been 
proposed for the Flathead River. The most recent would have 
dammed Buffalo Rapids below the existing Kerr Dam south of 
Poison. In May 1986, the tribal council decided against 
conducting feasibility studies for this proposed project. 
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Ron Therriault, tribal chairman at the time, was quoted in 
the tribal newspaper as saying: "Our prime question was, 'Do 
we want to dramatically alter the river?' We answered 'No, 
unanimously.'"*2 
Several months later in an interview, Therriault 
said that, not only would the dam have "changed the nature 
of things," it would have also been a poor business venture, 
because it would have been many years before the tribes 
would have seen any revenue. 
Obviously, that view was not shared by the dam's 
primary promoter Fred Houle Jr., a former tribal executive 
secretary. According to Houle, the dam would have provided 
jobs for hundreds of tribal members and long-term tribal and 
Indian income. "The tribes need meaningful jobs that fit the 
purpose of the reservation, which is to be a permanent 
homeland," he said at the time the tribal council rejected 
the plan.*4 
But councilman Vic Stinger of Pablo countered his 
argument with what seems to typify the present conservative 
nature tribal government has toward resource development and 
environmental protection. According to Stinger: "If we 
erred, we've done it correctly. The dam can still be built 
in 20 or 30 years if there's a need."*^ 
A dam at Buffalo Rapids would have become the second 
dam on the Flathead River. Kerr Dam, which began operating 
in the early 1930s, is by far the most dominant water 
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project on the reservation. It is also the tribes' biggest 
money maker, although its economic value to the Salish and 
Kootenai has only recently been realized. 
This 180-megawatt facility is on 2,000 acres of 
tribal land. Montana Power Co. (MPC) owns the dam and holds 
the federal license to operate it. In 1984, after 
threatening legal action that could have given the federal 
license to the tribes, the Salish and Kootenai came to terms 
with MPC over management of the dam through 2035. The 
agreement provides the tribes with about $9 million annually 
in rent payments, adjusted to inflation, for 30 years, and 
then allows the tribes the option of buying out MPC's 
interest in the dam and assuming management of the facility 
for the final 20 years of the license. 
That negotiated agreement came after battle dating 
to the 1920s. When the original plans for the dam were first 
revealed, a number of power sites were identified along the 
Flathead River below Flathead Lake. These sites were seen by 
the Montana Power Co. as having potential to supply 
electricity for the Anaconda Company's mining and smelting 
operations at Butte and Anaconda.*** They were also seen by 
Indian advocates as the "cheapest imminent development in 
the United States (and), "next to the Osage (Indians) oil 
field and certain great timber stands, the most valuable 
natural resource in Indian possession."*^ 
It was predicted that hydropower development of the 
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Flathead River could give the Flathead tribes "a large 
permanent income" and "self-supporting jobs" near their 
homes.*® That prediction, only now beginning to come true, 
was made more than five decades ago. 
Tribal officials were clearly pleased when the MPC 
settlement was announced. On Oct. 6, 1984, Teresa Wall, a 
tribal attorney during the MPC negotiations, was quoted in 
the Missoulian as saying the settlement was a "major victory 
and a wonderful thing.Kevin Howlett, a tribal 
councilman at the time, said: "What happened . . . was kind 
o o 
of like a dream come true." 
The 1984 agreement did dramatically increase the 
tribes' compensation and set them apart from all other 
Montana Indians. But tribal attorney Dan Decker says, in 
retrospect, that the agreement with MPC only serves to 
illustrate how the tribes were undercompensated throughout 
n *1 
the dam's first half century of existence. He notes that 
part of the compromise the tribes made with MPC was that 
they wouldn't ask MPC for retroactive payments, a point that 
was acknowledged at the time by an MPC spokesman. The 
Missoulian reported that MPC spokesman Dean Conklin said the 
negotiated settlement was "forward-looking," because it 
contained no retroactive payments." 
Historical accounts support Decker's viewpoint, and 
they indicate that the Salish and Kootenai were exploited 
like other Indian tribes. J In 1926, the original plan for 
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hydropower development at the Kerr site called for no 
compensation to the tribes. A political struggle ensued, 
pitting the tribes against utility interests, backed by the 
powerful Anaconda Co. and the federal government. By 1930, 
the tribes had won what was billed as a partial victory by 
securing rent payments of $175,000 annually. 
While that sum was considered reasonable at the 
time, rent payments stayed at about that same level for 
almost 40 years, ignoring inflation or growing MPC profits, 
according to Wall.24 By 1970, rental payments had been 
increased to $240,000 annually.2^ In 1978, two years after 
the tribes had filed a request to assume control of the dam, 
MPC agreed to boost its rental payments to $2.6 million 
annually, retroactive to 1975.2^ That's the amount the 
tribes were paid through 1985, the first year of the most 
recent MPC-Salish and Kootenai agreement. 
The consequences of the current agreement are 
impossible to ignore, as Kerr Dam is just beginning to live 
up to its early predictions as a source of significant 
tribal income. One immediate result of the Kerr Dam 
settlement is that, with a guaranteed $9 million coming into 
tribal government every year, the tribes no longer have to 
depend on the volatile timber industry for the majority of 
their revenue. 
The nature of the tribal economy has changed, as the 
reservation's forests no longer have the burden of raising 
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the bulk of tribal income. Timber sales from the 
reservation's 300,000 acres of commercial forests were once 
as high as $5 million annually, accounting for as much as 90 
7 7 
percent of total tribal revenue in some years. But not 
anymore. In 1985, the first year of the MPC agreement, 
tribal revenues were $12.5 million, with about $9 million 
coming from MPC. Meanwhile, income from timber sales dropped 
to under $1 million.2® 
While Kerr Dam provides an example of how water is 
responsible (albeit indirectly) for significant tribal 
income, perhaps the best way to measure the value of water 
to the Salish and Kootenai people is by examining the degree 
to which they will go to preserve water quality and quantity 
on their reservation. In this regard, the tribes control the 
bed and banks of their portion of Flathead Lake; they limit 
the size of docks or boathouses built along the shore, and 
they regulate shoreline modifications. Tribal government has 
also established a 90,000-acre wilderness area, an action 
that will help to protect water quality. And the tribes 
recently adopted an ordinance that seeks to prohibit the 
manipulation of all streambeds, riverbanks, and wetlands. 
These actions (discussed in greater detail in 
subsequent chapters) are consistent with tribal goals of 
self-determination, preservation of the environment, and the 
encouragment of recreation and tourism. 
However, the ultimate test for the tribes — and all 
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Montanans, especially western Montanans — may very well be 
the maintenance of Flathead Lake as a clean and healthy body 
of water. An environmental impact study in 1983 reported 
that the quality of water throughout the Flathead Basin area 
is generally excellent, including Flathead Lake.2^ But water 
quality is on the decline. 
According to that report: "Conservation of water 
quality in Flathead Lake presents the greatest management 
dilemma (in the Flathead Basin), with federal, state, 
provincial, tribal, county, municipal and private land-use 
decisions in the upper Flathead drainage all influencing 
conditions downstream. Although a multitude of regulations 
govern local land uses and water quality impacts, no agency 
is specifically charged with conserving water quality or 
monitoring the cumulative effects of land uses on Flathead 
waters. 
O 1 
Already the lake is showing signs of stress. A Algea 
blooms, a sign of nutrient-loading and excessive 
eutrophication, are being recorded in greater numbers each 
summer. Timber harvesting practices (road building and tree 
skidding, for example), fertilizer from agricultural lands, 
inadequate city sewage treatment facilities, and improper 
septic systems are speeding the rate of eutrophication. 
The tribes, like other agencies or organizations 
involved, are playing an important role in addressing these 
problems, problems that will only be solved through 
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cooperative management.^ Tribal and BIA research on 
quantification of streams, ponds, and lakes, water use, 
fisheries, wildlife, and waterfowl is being conducted 
throughout the reservation. In addition, the tribes 
financially support the work of the University of Montana 
Biological Research Station at Yellow Bay. 
But the Salish and Kootenai Tribes could do more. 
They could become the leading voice for a clean Flathead 
Lake. 
Tribal attorney Dan Decker believes the tribes, 
through the strength of their treaty, may have the strongest 
legal claim to clean water of all people in the Flathead 
River basin. The U.S. Supreme Court, in upholding the Namen 
Decision, had this to say about non-Indian development 
efforts along the shoreline of Flathead Lake: "Such conduct, 
if unregulated, could increase water pollution, damage the 
ecology of the lake, interfere with treaty fishing rights, 
or otherwise harm the lake, which is one of the most 
important tribal resources."^ 
Those are powerful words. They show the U.S. Supreme 
Court recognizes the lake is vital to the tribes, and they 
have a superior say over the lake's biological condition. 
This legal clout could be used to apply pressure upstream in 
the Kalispell, Bigfork, Whitefish, and Columbia Falls areas, 
where a growing population is adding significant 
environmental pressures on the lake. Decker says, "Things 
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like (the) Namen (Decision) help us to make assertions. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE NATURAL RESOURCES: 
TIMBER 
Timber resource: 
the long-time economic asset 
Steady revenues from Kerr Dam have lessened tribal 
demand on its vast timber resources. They have also allowed 
the tribes to express a growing displeasure over what some 
tribal leaders feel has been a historic abuse of the 
reservation's timber resources. 
With millions of dollars coming in annually from 
Kerr Dam, the tribes can now, for the first time, afford to 
reduce pressure on their forests and pursue goals more 
compatible with esthetics, recreation, and a clean 
environment. 
But perhaps even more important, according to tribal 
economist Ron Trosper, is that the tribes have become less 
dependent upon the federal government, which manages forests 
on this and all reservations.1 Forest management is one of 
the few so-called "trust responsibilities" — obligations 
the federal government has to Indians — that both Indians 
and federal government officials agree upon. 
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The Flathead Reservation's forest resources are 
| considered among the most studied, developed, and managed 
i 
1 Indian forest holdings in the West, dating back to the 
establishment of the reservation itself. A review of this 
u~ 
history, with a look at widely changing federal policy and 
economic conditions, helps to reveal why some tribal leaders 
today are disenchanted with the practice of forestry as they 
have come to view it from their experiences with the BIA. 
Some tribal members, like Salish and Kootenai tribal 
(water quality manager Thomas "Bearhead" Swaney, say that 
j 
| Indians did just fine managing their forests before the 
I white man moved in.3 It's only been since then that there 
have been problems. Swaney says he hasn't much use for 
foresters: "A forester's motto is 'Black is beautiful; burn 
it, and pave the sucker."4 Tribal official Jim Paro explains 
why people like Swaney believe as they do: "In the old days, 
it was rape the forests and get the revenues," even though 
that policy was generally supported by tribal government 
until the 1970s and early 1980s.^ 
The experiences of the past have led the Salish and 
Kootenai Tribes to an environmental movement of their own, 
albeit that movement is coming a decade after the national 
environmental movement, Paro says. The tribes, he says, are 
now looking at a more balanced approach to forest management 
than in the past. Water quality, recreation, wilderness, and 
t— 
wildlife are now being emphasized instead of timber 
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production. 
The most extensive historical account of the 
reservations' forest practices was published by Historical 
Research Associates (HRA), a Missoula organization, in 
1977.^ It reveals early practices of hygrading, when only 
the best trees were selected from the forest, leaving the 
genetically inferior trees to reproduce. Outbreaks of the 
forest disease dwarf mistletoe, which affect more than one-
third of the reservation's Douglas fir, larch and lodgepole 
pine forests, can be traced to those poor forest practices 
of the past.7 
The HRA report also reveals constantly changing 
federal policies and varying harvest rates, providing the 
tribes with a valuable resource, but one that never provided 
a stable income. For the first 45 years of the reservation 
to the year 1900, timber activity was minimal, as the area 
remained relatively wild and uninhabited. The Catholic 
church built a mill in 1856 at St. Ignatius, and the federal 
government followed with two mills of its own: one at its 
Indian agency headquarters on the Jocko River, near what is 
now Arlee, and the other at a sub-agency office near Ronan. 
The purpose of these mills was to provide materials 
to Indians who were developing farms. "When finished lumber 
was required, the Indians hauled logs to the government 
sawmills. . . Trespass was not a problem, and commercial 
O 
logging was still in the future," the HRA report states. 
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But the turn of the century brought many changes to the 
Salish and Kootenai people and their lands. The government 
began enrolling Indians on the reservation in 1902 in 
anticipation of an allotment policy that would be adopted by 
Congress two years later. Each Indian received either 80 
acres of farmland or 160 acres of grazing land, in keeping 
with the federal government's national Indian policy of 
assimilation under the Dawes Act of 1887. 
On April 1, 1910, the Flathead reservation was 
officially opened to homesteaders. After reserves were set 
aside for timber, townsites, future allotments and the bison 
sanctuary, nearly all — approximately 1.1 million acres of 
the reservation's total 1.2 million acres — became 
available to new settlers. Through subsequent legislation 
and an aggressive buy-back program, the tribes have since 
regained control to about half of their land. During the 
years that the Dawes Act was in effect, most of the forest 
lands were neither alloted to Indians nor homesteaded to 
whites. These lands and the forests upon them were to be 
managed by the federal government until they were disposed 
of under the Dawes Act. Proceeds from timber sales typically 
went to federal government accounts with the understanding 
that they would help support federal Indian policy. 
An estimated 38 million board feet of timber was cut 
Q 
on the reservation prior to 1917. But it was in that year, 
with a much-improved timber market and increased demands due 
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to World War I, as well as a growing western Montana 
population, which propelled the reservation into 14 years of 
its heaviest forestry activity ever. 
The year 1917 saw more than 19 million board feet of 
timber removed from the reservation.10 The following year, 
almost 57 million board feet were cut.*^ Timber harvesting 
peaked in 1923^jatien.jveariy—71 million board foet^were 
cut.*^ The pace continued through 1930, when the nation fell 
into a decade of economic depression. 
The 1930s brought the Civilian Conservation Corps 
(CCC) and the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934. Both significantly affected forestry practices on the 
reservation. While the CCC was building roads, trails, and 
working on water development projects in the reservation's 
forests, the Indian Reorganization Act redefined federal 
Indian policy by allowing Indians to establish federally 
recognized constitutions and governing bodies. It also 
marked the end of allotment policy and closed reservation's 
to further homesteading. Much of the unalloted forest lands 
were returned to the tribes. 
But perhaps even more significant was that the 
Indian Reorganization Act directed the Departmpnt- nf 
Interior to manage Indian lands on a sustained-yield 
• laasis.13 By 1945, the BIA had written its first management 
plan for the forests of the Flathead Reservation. That plan 
said cutting had been far too extensive for sustained yield. 
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It predicted that the reservation, which had yielded an 
average of 24 million board feet annually between 1911 and 
1944, would run out of wood by 1962.^ To delay what the BIA 
seemed to think was inevitable, it set an allowable cut of 
10 million board feet per year which would, as predicted, 
extend logging operations on the reservation through 1988. 
The goal of limiting annual harvest to 10 million 
board feet was never achieved, due to an increased demand 
for wood products during World War II years, a booming 
housing market that followed the war, and problems 
associated with a government agency managing a private 
forest. While the government was telling the tribes to cut 
less, the tribes were asking to cut more. They needed 
1 R ' ~ 
revenue and jobs. J 
Allowable cuts were modified in the 1955 to 26 
million board feet for the following year, 20 million board 
feet for the next few succeeding years, and eventually 
stabilizing at 10 million board feet. That goal was also 
never achieved. In the early 1960s, a new inventory of 
forest resources was conducted, resulting in the 1962 Forest 
Management Plan. Forest reserves were estimated at this time 
to be much larger than before, and in a remarkable turn­
around, the BIA increased allowable harvest to 71 million 
board feet. In 1968, the allowable cut was set even higher, 
at 76 million board feet, and nearly that amount of wood was 
removed that year from the reservation.^ 
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As intensive forestry practices increased in the 
1960s and 1970s, the tribes were able to raise more and more 
money from timber sales. Revenue went over the $1 million a 
year mark in 1966 and continued to bring in at least $1 
million every year through 1984.^ About 300 million board 
feet were cut between 1970 and 1975, raising $18 million in 
revenue. And since 1975, the BIA reports the following 
statistics: 
— Between 1975 and 1984, timber sales totaled $28.7 
1 ft 
million despite a recession in the early 1980s. 
— During that same time, sales of other wood 
products (logs, posts and poles, firewood, Christmas trees) 
totaled $5.7 million. 
— Forest-related employment from 1975 and 1984 paid 
a total of $8.1 million in wages or salaries.^® 
But times have changed; the wood product's industry 
is evolving, and the affects of that change can be seen on 
the reservation as well as all of Montana. The state's once 
vast reserves of virgin, old-growth ponderosa pine, larch, 
and Douglas fir are being replaced by younger and smaller 
trees. Mills geared to process the large-diameter virgin 
wood are becoming outdated. 
To Montanans — including the Salish and Kootenai, 
who have on occasion supplied up to 4 percent of the state's 
total harvest — this means the number of jobs available in 
forest industries will continue to decline as it has since 
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the late 1970s, according to Charles Keegan, a University of 
O 1 
Montana forest industries researcher. 
The recession of the early 1980s, caused by high 
interest rates and a near stand-still of the national 
housing market, resulted in Montana's statewide wood-
products workforce dropping from an all-time high of 11,000 
in 1978 and 1979 to about 7,500 in 1982.22 Total income for 
wood products workers dropped from $260 million to $170 
million, measured in 1982 dollars, over the same period. 
A corresponding break-down of figures for the 
Flathead Reservation were not available, but BIA Forestry 
Division Director Ken Dupuis says the recession placed a 
significant burden on the tribes, who supply wood to their 
own post and pole operation as well as to Plum Creek at 
Pablo, Missoula White Pine Sash, and Flodine Lumber Co. at 
Plains and Thompson Falls.2^ Dupuis says Indian and non-
Indian employment, and total harvest from reservation lands, 
have decreased since the late 1970s. The reservation came 
out of the wood product's recession in 1984, when the tribes 
sold 34.9 million board feet for $5.2 million. 
Keegan says the wood products industry will continue 
to play a vital role in western Montana, where it accouts 
for about half the region's economic base. But he predicts 
changes — changes that are already under way and could 
dramatically affect communities which rely heavily on the 
wood products industry.2^ For example, he says: 
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— Mills are becoming more computerized, mechanized 
and efficient, which often results in a declining demand for 
labor. 
— Large-log sawmills and plywood manufacturers are 
finding it difficult to adapt to the smaller size of trees 
available in the woods. These mills are more labor intensive 
and may be phased out. 
— Small-log sawmills, waferboard plants and pulp 
and paper mills are more highly mechanized and less labor 
intensive. They will be better suited to what's available 
from the forest as Montana moves into the 21st century. 
These changes will bring both good and bad news, 
according to Keegan. On the bright side, he says, "You do 
have an industry that is more competitive." Competitiveness 
should create an industry that will be less suseptible to 
dramatic swings in employment like Montana experienced 
during the recession of the early 1980s. To meet new market 
demands, the tribes' post and pole mill is now making deluxe 
surburban fences. These fences use small-diameter lodgepole 
pine and cater to a growing market in urban areas. 
The bad news, however, is that some mills which are 
not suited to the new state of the industry will have to re­
adjust or close, although he predicts that the rate of 
closures and lay-offs will decline in the coming years. 
Meanwhile, with $9 million in annual revenue from Kerr Dam, 
tribal leaders have de-emphasized timber production, and the 
future of reservation-based wood products industries is 
unclear. 
Harvests in 1985 and 1986 were under 10 million 
board feet each year and brought in less than $1 million 
annually, the first time such timber revenues have fallen 
below a seven-digit figure since 1965. Allowable cut has 
9 7 
been reduced to 39 million board feet a year. The number 
of forest acres classified as commercial has been reduced by 
the tribal council from 330,000 to under 300,000.^ And 
? Q 
tribal government has virtually banned clearcutting. 
Forestry practices on the Flathead Reservation, 
where selective cuts (a form of uneven-age management) are 
the rule, now are nearly opposite to those on nearby 
national forest, where clearcutting (a form of even-age 
management) is the common practice, according to Dupuis. In 
addition to making a financial mistake (lost future income 
from smaller and less efficient harvests, and from lost 
growth potential), Dupuis warns that the tribes may be 
making a silvicultural mistake as well. Clearcutting, common 
on surrounding national forest lands, provides the best 
treatment for dwarf mistletoe, a disease that has affected 
portions of western Montana's forest land. While the tribes 
allow some clearcutting as a silvicultural tool for 
mistletoe-infected forests, Dupuis says more is needed. 
For the most part, though, the tribes' current 
direction toward forest management is following many of the 
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suggestions offered in a 1974 environmental analysis by 
several University of Montana professors.^® Clearcuts, when 
allowed, are not as big; re-planting efforts have been 
improved; watershed management is now being carried out, and 
road closures within the reservation's forests reduce 
hunting pressure on deer.^ 
However, the Salish and Kootenai have chosen to 
ignore other parts of that 1974 assessment. The assessment, 
for example, in making a pitch for "quality timber 
management," warned against leaving portions of the 
o 9 
reservation's forests unroaded and in a natural condition. * 
"The economic loss to the tribes and other 
individual would be irreversibly and irretrievably committed 
if the unroaded areas were set aside as natural areas," 
according to the report. "Over the long term, massive fuel 
build up could lead to a high-intensity wildfire and result 
in irreversible and irretrievable losses in wealth and 
— ' •« 
a m e n i t i e s . T h e  r e p o r t  s a i d  t h a t  " t i m b e r  h a r v e s t i n g  w i l l  
introduce greater diversity. . . .^ 
However, intensive forest management with timber 
production as a primary goal "doesn't square" with the 
present notion of what a tribal homeland should be, 
according to Jim Paro. Nevertheless, forest industries will 
continue to play a role in what tribal government sees as a 
growing and diversifying economy. Even with today's reduced 
emphasis on timber, economist Trosper estimates that more 
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than 200 Indians work in the woods each summer, supplying 
local mills or the tribal post and pole operation with 
timber. A significant number of Indians also fight fires on 
various fire crews. 
It is important to note that the present forest 
management plan, drafted with the assistance of tribal 
government, does not preclude timber harvesting. And it does 
allow for some clearcutting when best suited to deal with 
insect or disease. Its goals and objectives are admirable. 
Among them: 
— Developing, maintaining and enhancing commercial 
forest lands in perpetuity by applying sound silvicultural 
methods and economic principles to reforestation, growth and 
harvesting of timber. 
— The preservation of the forest in its natural 
state whenever the tribal council determines that 
recreational, cultural, esthetic or traditional values 
represent the highest and best use of the land to the 
tribes. 
— To conduct forest management on a sustained yield 
basis. 
— To vigorously pursue the salvage of both dead and 
near-dead trees whenever possible. 
— Close roads when needed to protect wildlife 
habitat and guard against arson, trespass and poaching. 
— Continue collecting base-line data on vegetation 
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types, wildlife, soils and hydrology. 
The plan is another example of cooperative 
management between the tribes and the federal government. It 
seems to take into account the controversial nature of 
forest planning — that professionals from various 
disciplines disagree on best management, and that the forest 
has value beyond timber. If the plan's goals are met, and if 
the current tribal government's philosophy of environmental 
protection continues, the Salish and Kootenai tribal forest 
will meet the needs of a diverse constituency, and its worth 
to the tribes will be measured beyond mere stumpage value. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE NATURAL RESOURCES: 
RECREATION 
Recreation, tourism stand to gain 
from tribal self-determination policies 
The Flathead Indian Reservation's scenic beauty and 
natural heritage are among western Montana's primary 
economic assets. 
The reservation's natural beauty, its good land and 
moderate climate, and the opportunities for hunting and 
fishing have brought nearly 16,000 whites to live among the 
Indians on this 1.2-million acre reservation. No other 
Montana Indian reservation has been such a draw to the white 
man.^ 
History shows us, though, that whites learned long 
ago how to "sell" the reservation's scenic beauty. And 
they've done just that during the first part of the 20th 
century, beginning with federal policy under the Dawes Act 
which opened up Indian reservations to white settlement. One 
good example came in 1915, when the federal government 
advertised the sale of 905 "villa" lots around the southern 
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shore of Flathead Lake at places like Big Arm, Wild Horse 
Island, and Finley Point. These lots were all within the 
reservation's present boundaries, although maps and 
documents erroneously indicated that the reservation had 
ceased to exist.3 
The following description, as it appeared in 
promotional literature, complete with a map, was published 
on March 20 of that year by the Department of Interior: 
Flathead Lake, Montana, is situated 
near to and slightly southwest of Glacier 
National Park, the region of eternal ice, 
which may be reached by automobile from the 
lake in about three hours. The lake is in a 
valley 15 miles wide and 30 miles long, 
between the ranges of the Rocky Mountains of 
scenic beauty, whose slopes are covered with 
fir, larch, and pine trees. The lake has an 
area of about 360 square miles. The Flathead 
National Forest lies north, west, and east of 
the valley. The lake and streams abound in 
fish, and hunting is excellent. The lake is 
utilized for bathing, sailing, boating, 
yachting, and several steamboats ply between 
various towns on its borders. The shores are 
well adapted for the erection of wharves. 
The lands abutting the north half of 
the lake were disposed of many years ago, and 
numerous homes and fruit orchards have been 
established thereon. The south half of the 
lake is within the former Flathead Indian 
Reservation. The climate is delightful, the 
thermometer ranging from about zero to 75° to 
80° above. Apples, pears, cherries, peaches, 
and small fruits of the finest quality are 
raised upon lands bordering he lake, many 
without irrigation." 
. . . These villa sites are not only 
well adapted to summer villas for persons of 
wealth but for permanent homes for persons of 
moderate means and for fruit farming. Good 
roads, adapted to automobile use, skirt the 
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shores of the lake.4 
While whites have shown an ability to use the 
reservation's natural beauty and environmental attributes to 
achieve their economic and political goals, it has been only 
in recent years that tribal government has acted upon a 
similar realization. Attracting the recreational or tourist 
visitor have not been top tribal goals; in fact, they have 
only surfaced as such in the past couple of years.^ 
The 1985 tribal comprehensive plan devotes just one 
paragraph to the untapped recreational potential of the 
reservation.^ It reports that the tribes have been 
unsuccessful with their tourism efforts in the past, then 
notes that the tribes do raise some revenue from recreation 
permits sold to non-tribal members who use the Mission 
Mountains, Flathead Lake, and Flathead River, or other 
reservation property. There was no discussion of how the 
tribes might improve the recreation program, encourage more 
non-tribal members to purchase permits, or develop other 
recreational opportunities. 
The plan did, however, address the needs of the 
approximately 70 Indian-owned services and retail businesses 
on the reservation, many of which cater to the needs of 
visitors. These are part of an Indian private sector 
involving about 150 businesses, not including farms or 
ranches. While the plan noted that the Indian private sector 
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was large on this reservation (most Montana reservations 
have just a few Indian-owned businesses), it reported that 
most of the businesses needed assistance in marketing, 
O 
management, and finance. 
Tribal government did at one time experiment with a 
couple of tourist enterprises: a resort/motel on Flathead 
Lake at Blue Bay, and the spa/bathhouse at Hot Springs. But 
these projects were plagued by problems shared by other 
Montana Indian business ventures: poor planning, 
Q 
mismanagement, and inadequate marketing. Like the Crow 
Reservation's Sun Lodge on Interstate 90, all lost money and 
eventually went broke. 
Lately, though, the Salish and Kootenai have made 
public efforts to draw visitors. They disseminate colorful 
brochures describing the reservation's various recreational 
advantages.They extend an open invitation to visitors. 
They boast that the Mission Mountains are known as the "Alps 
of America. They encourage a visit to the 133-year-old 
Catholic mission at St. Ignatius. And they note that the 
reservation provides excellent opportunities for bird 
hunting, fishing, boating, skiing, snowmobiling, and 
backpacking. 
The recent emphasis on recreation is more of a by­
product of tribal self determination policies than the 
result of direct action aimed at luring visitors to the 
reservation. External forces have encouraged recreational 
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development. Some of those forces include: 
— The forest industries recession of the early 
1980s, which illustrated the dangers of dependence on a 
single industry. 
— A growing understanding by Indians that tribes 
which fail to assume control over their resources may lose 
the authority to manage them. If Indians don't manage their 
resources, some other agency will, and not necesarily 
according to tribal goals.*2 Since the reservation is 
blessed with recreational resources, recreation management 
is a logical function of tribal government. 
— The white population is growing faster than the 
Indian population. In 1980, Indians totaled 19.2 percent of 
the reservation population; by 1985, Indians totaled about 
16.6 percent.*3 Environmental protection policies that limit 
rapid development might "preserve a way of life that is 
irreplaceable," according to a tribally commissioned air 
quality study that recommended Class I air for the 
reservation.*4 Class I air is the highest standard under 
federal law, generally reserved for national parks and 
wilderness areas. As tribal leader Jim Paro says, "there 
won't be any steel mills on the reservation."*^ 
— Montana in general has been suffering an economic 
recession in just about all sectors of its economy, except 
one: tourism and recreation, which seem to be growing 
despite little promotional help from state government.*^ 
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Lake County, with economic development goals similar to the 
tribes, reports that travel-related jobs in Montana 
increased by 2,600 between 1979 and 1983.Travel 
expenditures by all visitors totaled $814 million in 1983, 
1 ft 
up 9 percent since 1979. ° And travel industry income 
(wages, salaries, profits, etc.) increased from $188 million 
in 1979 to $204 million in 1983, up 9 percent.*9 
Meanwhile, internal forces acting upon the tribes, 
all geared toward fulfilling self-determination goals as 
well as raising revenue to counter Reagan administration 
federal budget cuts, have also played a role in boosting 
tribal interest in recreation and tourism. Among those 
facters are: 
— The settlement between the Montana Power Co. and 
the tribes over operation of Kerr Dam. That agreement, which 
assures the tribes about $9 million annually (adjusted to 
inflation), relieved logging pressure on tribal forests and 
is making it easier for the Salish and Kootenai to manage 
their forests more for recreation and wildlife than timber. 
— Court decisions have given the tribes control 
over the bed and banks of the southern portion of Flathead 
Lake as well as the tribes' land, fish, and wildlife 
o n 
resources. This means that the tribes have been able to 
charge non-members a fee, in the form of a recreation 
permit, if they want to use those resources. Recreational 
permits raised about $100,000 in each of the past two years, 
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1985 and 1986.2* Revenues are used to fund management. 
— The designation of a 90,000-acre tribal 
wilderness in the Mission Mountains meets a number of tribal 
objectives: preservation of the scenic Mission Mountain 
front, water quality maintenance, protection of certain 
spiritual grounds, and the protection of wildlife, including 
the grizzly bear.22 But designation of these mountains as 
wilderness, along with the establishment of the tribes' 
Wildland Recreation Department, helps to ensure that the 
reservation will continue to offer quality backcountry 
experiences — experiences non-members pay for by purchasing 
recreation permits. Wilderness use is expected to increase 
in the coming years, as the availability of high-quality 
wildlands diminishes, says Herschel Mays, who directs the 
tribal Wildlands Recreation Department. 
— Establishing the strictest air quality standards 
possible under federal law and virtually banning unsightly 
clearcuts. Each action makes a clear statement about current 
tribal values. 
The above factors have caused tribal leaders like 
Therriault, Mays, and Paro to recognize the growing 
importance of recreation and tourism to the tribes, as 
their's and other leaders' views on conservation and 
resource management are laying the foundation for a 
reservation economy that will preserve and enhance present 
recreational opportunities well into the next century. 
158 
A look at two existing tribal programs, both aimed 
at meeting tribal self-determination goals, serve as an 
example. They show how the Salish and Kootenai are improving 
recreation and tourism opportunities within the reservation, 
while simultaneously meeting self-determination and economic 
development goals. 
Shoreline Protection 
The controversial Namen Decision of 1982 allowed the 
tribes to move ahead with their Shoreline Protection 
ordinance, which is aimed at regulating the bed and banks of 
the southern shores of Flathead Lake. 
Current codes were adopted in 1983, when the tribes 
opened their Shoreline Protection Office.24 Directed by J. 
Lloyd Jackson, this branch of tribal government has taken on 
the responsibility of protecting tribal rights to the 
portion of Flathead Lake that courts have recognized as 
theirs. 
Jackson says the primary tribal goal is, "to 
maintain the shoreline as nature meant it to be."^ The 
lake, according to Jackson, "is a natural resource that is 
worth a lot of money. And we are going to take care of it." 
Keeping the lake as esthetically pleasing as possible, 
"instead of trashing it," will only help to encourage 
quality recreational experiences for all who use this 
resource, whites or Indians, he says. 
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The tribes enacted the ordinance because they 
believed the shoreline around the lake was in trouble due to 
"increasing population and ever greater utilization" of the 
shorelines, thereby decreasing the value of the shoreline 
and lake.2® According to the ordinance, "there exists an 
immediate need to regulate such activities and manage the 
shorelines so as to preserve and protect them and, to the 
greatest extent possible, restore them to their original 
? 7 
condition."* 
To accomplish these goals, the tribes have, among 
other regulations, taken the following actions: 
— Established a seven-member Shoreline Protection 
Board to carry out the provisions of the Shoreline 
Protection ordinance. The tribes allow three non-members to 
serve on the board, which has broad authority to issue 
rules, regulations, standards, conduct hearings, and 
authorize variances — all, of course, subject to the 
oversight of the tribal council. Allowing non-Indians to 
serve on the board helps enhance relationships between the 
two races, especially since most of the people affected by 
the Shoreline Protection Ordinance are white. 
— Banned shoreline manipulation (landfills or 
dredging, for example) without approval. 
— Required shoreline owners to obtain building 
permits for wharves, docks, or breakwaters, established set­
back requirements for shoreline buildings, and limited how 
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far docks can extend into the water. Plans for any shoreline 
structures must meet specific tribal codes, and they 
ultimately must be approved by the tribal council. 
— Banned boathouses or garages below the lake's 
high-water mark. 
— Began a program of shoreline and recreation 
management on the lake that usually places at least two 
representatives of tribal government on the southern portion 
of the lake each day in the summer months. These tribal 
employees inspect the shoreline and construction activities, 
check for damaged docks, check for recreation permits, and 
mark hazards in the lake. 
According to Jackson, fees and fines from this 
program raise about $35,000 a year, which pay for 20 percent 
of the tribes' cost to run the program. The ordinance has 
jurisdiction over 1,343 lakefront property owners along 108 
miles of shoreline. While it initially met with significant 
opposition (it was challenged all the way to the U.S. 
Supreme Court), Jackson says all but about a dozen lakefront 
property owners are now cooperating. 
Wilderness Management 
The Salish and Kootenai tribal government carries 
out an ambitious plan for managing the reservation's 
wildland resources, centered on the Mission Mountain Tribal 
Wilderness. 
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And while the tribe's wilderness holdings and 
management is far from being lucrative, the wilderness 
management program has become another example of the tribes 
successfully managing one of their resources in a way that 
is compatible with self-determination goals, helps preserve 
tribal members' cultural connections to the land, yet 
enhances the quality of life for all Monantans. 
Herschel Mays likes to note that the Salish and 
Kootenai were the first Indian tribes in the nation to 
"intentionally and willingly" follow concepts of the 1964 
Wilderness Act by declaring part of their land wilderness 
and adopting a management program aimed at retaining the 
land's pristine and wild values. Mays uses the words 
"intentionally and willingly" because there have been Indian 
wilderness areas before, but none resulting from tribal 
actions. 
Wilderness advocate Bob Marshall, when he was in 
charge of forestry on Indian lands, championed the idea of 
O O 
managing some of those lands as wilderness. ° And in 1937, 
Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes designated a number of 
? Q 
"roadless and wild areas" within Indian country. One of 
those areas included 127,000 acres of the Mission Mountains 
on the Flathead Indian Reservation.3® 
The government order calling for roadless management 
of the Missions was rescinded in 1958 at the request of the 
tribes, which maintained that they could lose the potential 
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to harvest a significant amount of timber.3* The tribes 
feared the area might be included in a national wilderness 
act that was being drafted in Congress. 
But according to historical accounts, the tribes 
were not opposed to wilderness. In fact, the tribes had 
suggested that the area be managed as an Indian national 
park as early as 1936. Although nothing ever became of 
that idea, the concept is intriguing. According to a 1936 
press release: 
It is planned to maintain the Park in 
its pristine natural state. Roads will not be 
built throughout the area. A complete system 
of trails will be built, and some trails are 
already constructed in this region. These 
trails will, for the most part, follow old 
Indian trails. . . . 
Indian guides will be available to 
conduct parties through the Park. The visitor 
will be able to hire these guides by the day 
or week, as suits his plans. For those who do 
not wish a guide, special trips will be 
outlined in advance and instructions 
furnished on application. 
Indians will be encouraged to camp 
and live in the Park. Visitors will thus be 
able to see and come to know them. . . . 3 
In subsequent years, the tribes opposed efforts by 
timber companies and the BIA to harvest trees from the 
Mission "face," clearly visible from throughout the 
valley.34 However, the tribes came to see federal actions to 
set regulations on the Mission Mountains as a violation of 
their rights to do what they want with their land. Then in 
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1975, the tribes declared the south and north forks of the 
Jocko drainage as "tribal wild areas." That action was 
followed in 1979 by establishing the present-day 90,000-acre 
Mission Mountain Tribal Wilderness. 
Mays also likes to point out that simply declaring 
an area wilderness is one thing; drafting, adopting, and 
implementing a management plan is another. The Salish and 
Kootenai have done both. 
Just as many managers of parks or wildernesses say 
their jobs require more people management than resource 
management, such is the case in the tribal wilderness, Mays 
says. Although use of the wilderness is considered slight, 
Mays says it grows each year, primarly as more people from 
Missoula or Kalispell discover its diversity. 
The tribal wilderness management plan is a 102-page 
document that covers history, tribal goals, management 
objectives, and specific policies, along with chapters on 
the wilderness' vegetation, fish, wildlife, watershed, and 
cultural resources. In drawing up the wilderness management 
plan, the tribes sought help from the University of Montana 
Wilderness Institute — showing tribal willingness to go off 
the reservation for expertise. 
The plan has been modeled after the 1964 Wilderness 
Act, Mays says, but with certain exceptions. For example, 
some motorized equipment is used in maintenance, although 
the practice is discouraged. Highlights from the plan 
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include: 
— Requirements that non-tribal members purchase 
recreation permits to use the wilderness. These are the same 
recreational permits that non-tribal mambers must purchase 
to use all Indian lands or waters. In 1986, recreational 
permits cost $10 yearly, $6 for three days, or $3 per day. 
This fee structure has been restructured as follows: $5 
yearly for a recreational permit; $10 for a fishing stamp, 
and $15 for a hunting stamp. It is hoped that the new fee 
schedule will raise an additional $200,000 yearly.^ 
— Establishment of a 10,000-acre special management 
area surrounding McDonald Peak for grizzly bears. A dozen or 
more grizzlies congregate there each summer to feed on 
ladybugs and army cutworm moths. The tribes close the area 
to people from mid-summer through Oct. 1. The primary 
concern is for the safety of people, as the area is popular 
with backpackers, but the tribes say they also want to give 
bears some peace and quiet for their own sake. 
— The Mission Mountains have served as "a guide, 
passage way, fortification and vision seeking grounds, as 
well as a place to gather medicinal herbs, roots, and a 
place to hunt for food. . . ."36 under the management plan, 
these values will be retained. It is possible, for example, 
for a tribal member to kill a grizzly bear, provided it is 
in the context of traditional religion and has been approved 
by the tribal council. Generally, matters of spiritual and 
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cultural importance are guarded closely by the tribes. For 
example, the wilderness management plan requires that 
archaeological and historic sites remain undisturbed, and 
the location of spiritual sites will not be disclosed. 
— Management of the wilderness area is to be in 
such a way as to preserve the primal nature of the land, 
vegetation, and animals. One of the beauties of this 
wilderness, Mays says, is that it has relatively few trails, 
not many signs, and is diverse and rugged. People like to 
visit it for these qualities, he says, and the management 
plan prohibits major changes. No more trails can be built, 
for example, although existing trails or bridges can and are 
being improved. 
By implementing these and other ordinances relating 
to recreation and conservation, the Salish and Kootenai 
Tribes have clearly stated their desire to manage the 
reservation and its resources in such a way that will allow 
them to determine their own destiny under self-determination 
policy as well as preserve the natural environment. 
Clean air, clean water, wildlife habitat, fisheries, 
protection of shorelines and streambeds — all these have 
become matters of tribal jurisdiction in recent years. By 
setting up management programs that protect these resources, 
the Salish and Kootenai are showing that they can govern 
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themselves, raise money for management, and encourage high-
quality recreation opportunities. If the tribes win their 
battle for self-determination, it appears that the real 
winners will be all those who seek the Flathead Reservation 
for recreational pursuits. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE NATURAL RESOURCES: 
WILDLIFE 
Tribal government asserts control 
over fish and game management 
As the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes have 
done with water, timber, and recreational resources, they 
now are doing with their fish and wildlife: using them as 
artillery in the battle for political self-determination. 
The motivation behind tribal government's self-
determination activities is simple: the belief that if the 
Salish and Kootenai people don't manage their resources, 
somebody else will — and not necessarily with tribal 
interests in mind. This logic was used by tribal Wildland 
Recreation Department Director Herschel Mays in explaining 
why the tribes designated a portion of the Mission Mountains 
as wilderness, adopted a management plan, and began 
implementing that plan. And it was the same logic used by 
tribal Shoreline Protection Office Director J. Lloyd Jackson 
in explaining why the tribes took control of the bed and 
banks of the southern portion of Flathead Lake.2 
The case of fish and wildlife management on the 
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reservation is no different, according to tribal attorney 
John Carter.3 He says other Indian reservations have learned 
the hard way, from bad experiences, that Indian governments 
failing to assume responsibilites often have responsib­
ilities taken away. 
Montana's Crow Indians provide one example. The 
Crow's fiscal and management performance was so poor in the 
1970s that the federal government placed a Bureau of Indian 
Affairs employee in charge of the day-to-day management of 
tribal government from 1980 to 1986.^ And Wyoming's Wind 
River Reservation provides an example specific to fish and 
wildlife management. Carter says tribal factions on that 
reservation were unable to come together behind a 
comprehensive, reservation-wide hunting and fishing program, 
so the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service intervened with a 
program of its own. Fish and game policies were adopted 
without tribal input; treaty rights were curtailed, hunting 
for religious purposes was banned, and violations of law 
became federal offenses instead of tribal offenses.^ The 
federal government told the Indians, "We're going to do it 
until you can do it yourselves," Carter says. 
Allowing a similar scenerio to be played out on'the 
Flathead Reservation would be a mistake for tribal members, 
he says. As a result, the tribes' legal office has drafted a 
new hunting and fishing ordinance.® Known as "44-D" of 
tribal codes, this ordinance significantly broadens Indian 
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jurisdiction on the reservation and lays the foundation for 
the tribes to eventually take over the lead role in fish and 
wildlife management. 
The ordinance, which details reservation-wide 
hunting and fishing codes for both tribal members and non-
members and sets a fee schedule for non-member licenses, 
provides another example of Salish and Kootenai tribal 
natural resource policy aimed at self-determination and 
economic development. 
Under the new codes, non-Indians will be required to 
purchase licenses to hunt on all lands within the 
reservation, regardless of whether the land is privately 
owned, state-owned, or Indian-owned. In addition, non-
Indians will also have to buy a recreational permit to use 
Indian lands. Fees have been set at $5 for the recreational 
permit, $15 for a hunting stamp, and $10 for a fishing 
stamp. Violations of rules or regulations will be enforced 
in tribal court through civil procedures, with fines of up 
to $5,000. 
According to tribal Fish and Game Conservation 
Department officer Frank Acevedo, the new ordinance, with 
its fee schedule, will raise up to $300,000 a year, and will 
help fund fish, game, and recreation management programs on 
the reservation.7 Previously, a $10 per year recreation 
permit was the only source of tribal revenue to come from 
hunters or fishermen, and total revenue from those permits 
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has been just $100,000. 
Tribal motivation for 44-D is stated at the 
beginning of the ordinance: "Tribal regulation and control 
of hunting and fishing on Reservation lands and recreational 
activities of non-members on trust status lands based on 
sound management principles will protect and enhance Tribal 
resources, thus ensuring that those rights guaranteed by the 
United States Government shall survive and inure (accrue) to 
O 
the benefit of future generations."0 
The ordinance was approved in 1986 by the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs. According to BIA wildlife biologist Jim 
Claar, it is no longer a question of whether it will be 
Q 
adopted, but what form it will take. Claar describes 44-D 
as "the basis for all fish and wildlife management on the 
reservation" and says it is part of a course of federal and 
tribal policy that will eventually result in the BIA turning 
over its fish and wildlife management responsibilities to 
the tribes. 
"That's what self-determination is all about," he 
says, adding that he believes the Salish and Kootenai have a 
good chance at making these policies work. He says Salish 
and Kootenai efforts in the realm of wildlife and natural 
resource management are "as progressive or more progressive 
than any other reservation." 
However, the tribes' assumed authority over fish and 
wildlife has placed them at direct odds with the state, 
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which also assumes management authority over fish and game 
on the reservation. Ordinance 44-D, which went into effect 
April 1, 1987, may end up in court if the state follows 
through with its threat to sue the tribes.10 
Questions that need to be resolved include: 
— Will hunters and fishermen need to buy two sets 
of licenses, one from the tribes and one from the state, to 
hunt on the reservation? 
— Will tribal hunting and fishing regulations apply 
to all lands within the reservation, including lands owned 
or managed by the state, or private lands that have passed 
out of Indian ownership? Or will they apply only to Indian 
lands? This question is critical, since the state owns the 
Nipepipe Wildlife Management Area, a popular waterfowl 
hunting area. 
— How are hunters or fishermen going to deal with 
two sets of regulations over the same resources? Will they 
cooperate with two sets of game wardens? 
— What court system will deal with violations, 
tribal, state, or both? 
In early 1987, both the state and the tribes were 
getting ready for a battle over these issues. The state was 
maintaining that tribal codes should only apply to tribal or 
Indian lands; the tribes said they will apply to all 
reservation lands. Until this issue is resolved, hunters or 
fishermen will probably have to buy two sets of licenses 
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($25 from the tribes, $35 from the state), and deal with two 
sets of regulations. 
Dialogue at a Feb. 9, 1987 public hearing at tribal 
headquarters in Pablo indicated that the tribes and the 
state may be in for a long struggle. The purpose of that 
hearing was to let the public raise complaints, or ask 
questions of tribal leaders regarding 44-D. A racially mixed 
audience of about 75 people attended. 
It was at this meeting when the state's objections 
to 44-D were first publically raised.11 An attorney from 
Poison, who objected to 44-D, read portions of a letter 
expressing concern over 44-D from state Department of Fish, 
Wildlife and Parks Director James Flynn to the tribes. 
Flynn, in this Feb. 3 correspondence, questioned 
whether the tribes' new hunting and fishing codes were based 
on science. According to Flynn, "A major concern of the 
Department over the proposed hunting regulations is whether 
they are based on specific biological information. Because 
of this problem, we cannot speak with any certainty about 
their (the regulations') potential effect on the wildlife 
resource."12 
The tribes, meanwhile, responded that recent BIA and 
tribal studies on the reservation's fish and wildlife 
resources were adequate and that the new regulations were 
based on good data. "We probably have better data than the 
state ever dreamed of," according to tribal fisheries 
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biologist Dave Cross, who said: "I would take issue with 
that portion of the letter."13 
Some whites were sharply opposed to the new rules, 
but others, like Jack Puckett of the Big Sky Upland Bird 
Association from Missoula, encouraged the tribes to 
implement 44-D.1^ "We are glad the tribes are considering 
doing some management on the land. We encourage you, and we 
hope you make great progress," he said. Another Missoula 
resident, Bob Lucas, describing himself as a 20-year 
waterfowl hunter on the reservation, said he has noticed a 
continuing depletion of habitat. He said that tribal 
management activities would be supported by non-tribal 
members, if the tribes could improve hunting.1^ 
"If you can improve the opportunities, there's 
plenty of people who will pay more (to hunt)," he said, 
adding that the $25 for non-member licenses is not, in his 
opinion, too high. 
Meanwhile, tribal Vice Chairman Ron Therriault 
firmly asserted the tribes' political position.^ He would 
not comment directly on negotiations between the tribes and 
the state. But what he did say shows the tribes' confidence 
in their position: "We have a treaty with the United States 
government, not the state of Montana. 
"What we do not intend to do — as we have done in 
the past — is to approach the negotiations from a 
subservient position." He acknowledged that the tribes and 
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the state "may end up with one hell of a fight." 
The adoption of ordinance 44-D is part of a growing, 
decade-old effort on the part of the tribes — with 
assistance from the federal government and the University of 
Montana — to manage their fish and wildlife resources. 
In 1976, the tribes created the tribal Fish and Game 
Conservation Office and staffed it with three officers, says 
Acevedo, who now directs a staff of nine. Officers from this 
department enforce tribal fish and game regulations, check 
for recreation permits, and will play a central role in 
seeing that provisions of 44-D are enforced. 
In 1977, the tribes contracted with the federal 
government to hire a wildlife biologist, their first, and 
one of the first Indian staff biologists in the United 
States. In 1978, two federal wildlife positions within the 
BIA were established, after pressure was applied by the 
tribes. 
Claar, who was one of those first two BIA 
biologists, says much of his work has been to help design 
timber sales to minimize damage to wildlife habitat, and to 
help mitigate other effects of development such as building 
new roads. Surveys have also been conducted to determine 
what species live where, and in what numbers. 
The goals of his office include restoring and 
preserving populations of native species: grizzly bears, 
black bears, deer, elk, big horn sheep, and west-slope 
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cutthroat trout, for example. He characterizes the overall 
wildlife situation on the reservation as good. Unlike many 
parts of Montana, the reservation is home to at least four 
threatened or endangered species: peregrine falcon, bald 
eagle, grizzly bear, and gray wolf, he says. And most of 
reservation is adequately stocked with a variety of species, 
he says. 
"The general perception that the reservation is 
devoid of wildlife is not true at all," Claar says, adding: 
"It is inaccurate to say that the Indians have wiped out the 
wildlife." 
Claar admits that logging and roadbuilding in some 
areas have diminished what he calls "habitat effectiveness" 
and have allowed easy access for hunters. Some of those 
areas are lacking in wildlife. But he maintains that hunting 
pressure on the reservation, even though it is year-round, 
is light — perhaps lighter per unit of area than off the 
reservation. He says he is working on a study that will 
assess hunting intensity on reservation lands versus non-
reservation lands. 
That the tribes regulate their members' hunting 
activity is also contrary to general perception. But the 
tribes do regulate hunting and fishing by tribal members, 
both on the reservation and off the reservation on 
traditional hunting grounds. Granted, restrictions are 
minimal compared to state hunting and fishing codes. But 
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Claar said current tribal codes seem to be working. 
Acevedo admits that it has been difficult to 
convince tribal members of the need to impose rules and 
regulations on hunting and fishing. Many tribal members 
believe they have a right to hunt as often as they want, 
whenever they want, and on all parts of the reservation. 
That may have been the case in the past, but it isn't any 
more. The tribes have, in recent years, begun enforcing a 
number of regulations and closures. Here are some examples 
from 1986 codes: 
— Females of big game species are not allowed to be 
taken between Feb. 1 and Sept. 1. 
— Big horn sheep hunting is prohibited. 
— Hunting or trapping native cats is prohibited. 
— The Ferry Basin Area, northwest of the National 
Bison Range, is closed to elk hunting. 
— Off-reservation moose hunting is generally 
limited to one animal per tribal member per year, although 
the tribal council can make exceptions for subsistence 
purposes. 
— Salmon fishing on Flathead Lake has been 
prohibited. 
— Trout fishing on the Flathead River between Kerr 
Dam and the Clark Fork is catch-and-release only. 
— Fishing on the Jocko River is restricted to 
catch-and-release. 
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These rules continue to be controversial, but 
Acevedo says he believes tribal members are learning to 
recognize the need for tribal government to manage its fish 
and wildlife in a manner that will ensure tribal control as 
well as survival of the reservation's natural heritage. 
The tribes have been involved in other activities in 
the realm of fish and wildlife management. All are geared to 
the conservation of these resources and the maintenance of 
the Flathead Indian Reservation as an environmentally clean 
tribal homeland for the Salish and Kootenai people. 
Another recent controversial tribal action, the 
Aquatic Lands Conservation Ordinance, seeks to protect 
wetlands, streambeds, and riverbanks, all of which are 
important to fish and wildlife. It would replace county 
conservation districts with a board of tribal and non-tribal 
members who would be responsible to tribal council. 
Like the the new hunting and fishing codes, the 
tribes maintain that the Aquatic Lands Conservation 
Ordinance applies to the entire reservation, regardless of 
land ownership. State and county officials disagree, saying 
tribal codes should only apply to tribal or Indian lands. 
Negotiations between the county, state, and tribes were 
underway in early 1987, but no immediate resolution to this 
conflict was in sight. 
Recently, the tribes and the BIA have taken steps to 
rebuild populations of big horn sheep, which were 
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reintroduced at various locations within the reservation. 
Cooperative studies funded by the Bonneville Power 
Administration on the affects of Kerr Dam on Canada geese 
are ongoing.18 Other cooperative efforts between the tribes, 
BIA, and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service are aimed at 
boosting native trout populations in tribal waters, 
1 9 
including some of the high-mountain lakes in the Missions. * 
However, grizzly bears have become the most 
controversial wildlife species on the reservation, and they 
pose unique management problems for the entire Mission 
Valley. Research has indicated that the combined density of 
people, livestock, and bears on the west slope of the 
? n 
Mission Mountains is probably unequaled in North America. u 
Too many grizzlies die prematurely, often after an 
encounter with people, Claar says. Some bears are poached; 
some killed by ranchers who suffer losses of domestic 
animals. And still others are killed after attacking a 
human. 
The current grizzly bear management plan recognizes 
pi . 
the precarious status of the grizzly. x Habitat is being 
lost to new subdivisions in the valley. The grizzly 
population is on the decrease, and each bear — especially 
the females — are important if the population is to 
recover, the plan states.22 To the tribes* credit, they've 
protected an essential part of the grizzly habitat. The 
Mission Mountain Tribal Wilderness provides a relatively 
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safe haven for part of year: The tribes' wilderness 
management plan allows for specific trail closures if 
circumstances call for such a closure, and 10,000 acres of 
the wilderness are closed to people for several weeks each 
summer. 
Critical grizzly habitat has been identified, and 
the forest plan for the reservation call for special 
consideration of the grizzly. Some areas of the 
reservation's commercial forest have been taken out of 
commercial status by the tribal council, and forest 
practices on remaining commercial stands are designed to 
mitigate adverse effects of logging on grizzly bears. 
If tribal and federal goals of grizzly survival are 
to be achieved, a coordinated, cooperative management effort 
on the part of the tribes, the BIA, the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service, counties, and the state is needed.2^ The 
role of state and county subdivision laws, along with a 
coordinated education effort aimed at teaching people how to 
live with grizzlies, will play an increasingly important 
role. 
The Salish and Kootenai Tribes, with their treaty 
rights to wildlife and growing authority over reservation 
resources, have the chance to become the grizzly bear's 
loudest and most vigorous advocate. Their cultural tie to 
the bear is the longest and strongest, extending backwards 
in time for centuries. But the Salish and Kootenai Tribes' 
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link with the bear exists today and extends into the future, 
too. Both the Indians and the bear are threatened by outside 
forces. And it seems that if the Salish and Kootenai can 
preserve grizzly populations, they will also be saving 
themselves. 
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CONCLUSION 
A STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL, 
A VISION FOR THE FUTURE 
Salish and Kootenai progress 
offers unique Indian example, 
but other Montana tribes may not survive 
Montanans need not go to Third World countries to 
see pervasive poverty, widespread unemployment, unmanaged 
resources, and underdeveloped governments. These problems, 
as illustrated in this report, can be found, to varying 
degrees, on all seven Montana Indian reservations. 
Montana's Indians today, like all Indians in 
America, are a product of their past, a result of more than 
150 years of interaction with the dominant white society. 
They are a product of the reservation system. Alcoholism 
affects most Montana reservation families. Indian health is 
significantly below the level of the general public; their 
illnesses are more frequent and severe, and they die 
younger. Unemployment ranges from 27 percent to 85 percent. 
More than half of Montana's reservation Indians live beneath 
the federal government's poverty line. 
These problems, not limited to Indians in Montana, 
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are certainly not new. Indian leaders, academic scholars, 
writers, and politicians have long sought the solution to 
the so-called "Indian problem." Interestingly, the dialogue 
in Indian country today is much the same as it was 100 years 
ago. Only specific policies have changed; sometimes they've 
favored assimilation into the larger society, other times 
they've recognized Indians' sovereign right to exist from 
treaties. Only recently has there been an concerted effort 
to mesh the two seemingly polar concepts. 
That's good. But it won't be enough. The problems in 
Indian country are too diverse and too complex. Inadequate 
education, political instability, racial prejudice and 
hostility, poor relations between Indian and non-Indian 
governments, poverty, disease, inadequate land and resource 
management, the need for continued federal aid: all these 
issues have to be addressed, and in a comprehensive fashion. 
Meanwhile, the dominant white society needs to recognize it 
has a legal and moral obligation to uphold the treaties. 
Montanans must acknowledge that this state's Indian 
reservations are its developing nations; sovereigns within a 
sovereign, governments unlike any other in the United 
States. That is because Indians are different from any other 
ethnic group in America. Right or wrong, like it or not, 
Indians are special; they are the first Americans, and our 
forefathers agreed to treaties, making Indians unique, 
generations ago. 
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Yet despite these treaties, Indians' continue to 
fear "termination," the word used to describe the process of 
treaty abrogation. In the 1950s, the federal government 
eliminated federal recognition of more than 100 tribes or 
bands of Indians. At the same time, the federal government 
was relocating Indian families from reservations to big 
cities, where Indians were placed in factory jobs to become 
assimilated into the larger society. Both policies are 
considered failures. 
Today, termination is coming in the form of federal 
budget cuts which have, during President Ronald Reagan's 
first six years in office, forced the issue of self-
determination. Tribal governments, which have taken on broad 
responsibilities under self-determination policy, are being 
forced to find other sources of income to meet the needs of 
their people. The wealthier tribes — like those on the 
Flathead and Fort Peck reservations — are finding ways to 
adapt; the poor are not, and their survival is questionable. 
Typically, tribes are finding that they must look 
toward their natural resources for meeting the costs of 
their growing governments. In Montana, coal, oil, gas, 
hydropower, water, rangeland, and cropland are all being 
looked at to fill the financial niche once occupied by the 
federal government, which seems to be forcing Indians to 
exploit their resources now and worry about future 
generations later. The potential effect of this policy on 
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the land and its people could be devastating. 
Montana Indians have learned that merely having 
natural resources does not provide economic security or the 
preservation of a culture. Five of Montana's reservations — 
Crow, Northern Cheyenne, Fort Peck, Blackfeet, and Flathead 
— have significant natural resource bases. Yet only two, 
the Flathead and Fort Peck, have been successful at turning 
those resources into relatively strong tribal economies. And 
only one, the Flathead, has gained financial stability. 
For the others, economic and cultural survival will 
be a difficult goal. Consider the following: 
— Fort Belknap and Rocky Boy's Indians have 
virtually no source of tribal revenue, small land bases, and 
limited resources. Their hopes for the future depend on 
agriculture and the hope of irrigation that may come with 
the proposed major water diversion project that would link 
the Missouri River with the Milk River. Since Fort Belknap 
and Rocky Boy's reservations have no money, and federal aid 
has dropped sharply, their hope for industrial development 
is also slim. Wisely, both these reservations are 
emphasizing culturally sensitive education. They talk of 
developing their "human resources," since natural resources 
are nonexistent or unmarketable. Their approach is good, but 
success will require continued government assistance, 
especially in education. 
— Politics on the Blackfeet Reservation are called 
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"cutthroat" and "unstable." Charges of nepotism within 
tribal government surface frequently. The tribe usually 
elects an all-new tribal council every two years, preventing 
long-term planning and steady leadership or direction. 
Recreation and tourism provide great opportunities for the 
future; so does petroleum. The new alliance between white 
environmentalists (the Badger Chapter) and Blackfeet 
traditionalists over protection of the Badger-Two Medicine 
area is facilitating a beneficial public debate in the media 
of Indian religion, treaty rights and Forest Service policy. 
Eventually, the interaction between the various groups 
involved in the Badger-Two Medicine issue could lead to an 
enlightened form of cooperative resource management between 
the Forest Service and Blackfeet government, helping the 
Blackfeet to further their self-determination efforts and 
protecting their historic interest in the region. However, 
the overall political instability on the Blackfeet 
reservation makes it impossible to predict how long the 
alliance between whites and Indians will stay together. The 
bottom line on the Blackfeet Reservation is that the tribe 
needs to come together politically if it wants to move 
ahead. 
— Crow Indians had their government taken away from 
them in 1980. They got it back in 1986. But before they can 
make much progress in economic development, they must prove 
that they can deal with the most basic of governmental 
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responsibilities: fiscal accountability. Their political 
system, featuring a tribal council of all adult members who 
meet four times a year, is plagued with political turmoil. 
While it offers the purest form of democracy in Montana, and 
perhaps in the entire United States, it must be changed. The 
Crow version of democracy may have worked in another time 
and under different circumstances, but it is outdated today 
and seriously cripples the tribe's ability to compete in the 
outside world. 
— Annual tribal income on the Northern Cheyenne 
ballooned into the millions earlier this decade, when Shell 
Oil Co. entered into an exploration agreement with the 
tribe. After seven dry wells, Shell pulled out. Today, with 
most of the Shell money spent, the tribe is going broke and 
tribal government is in disarray. In 1986, the Northern 
Cheyenne elected their third tribal chairman in as many 
years; they tossed out the two previous chairmen amid 
charges of incompetence and corruption. On the resource 
front, the Northern Cheyenne have repeatedly refused to 
develop their coal, citing that they do not want to exploit 
their land and that they want to keep bad influences — 
crime, drugs, alcohol — off the reservation. Despite their 
anti-development stance, alcoholism, stemming from poverty 
and despair, affects nearly every family. The Northern 
Cheyenne reservation situation illustrates the dilemma that 
today's Indian leaders face: should they invite the outside 
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world into their reservation at the potential risk of losing 
their culture and resource base, or should they bar the door 
and face continued poverty. Indians lose in either instance. 
— Management skills, generally acquired off the 
reservations, are lacking on most Montana reservations. 
College-educated Indians say they are discriminated against 
by their fellow Indians. Indians successful in business 
report that they, too, are discriminated against. Indian 
communities need to resolve these issues, for if they are to 
achieve economic and political development, they cannot 
remain entirely isolated from the realities of the outside 
world. 
— Montana's tribes are part of Montana, and when a 
recession strikes Montana, it also strikes the reservations. 
The crash in energy markets has hit the hardest, and those 
tribes who became the most dependent on energy resources for 
revenue have learned that exploiting oil, gas, or coal will 
bring a bust just as sure as a boom. 
However, the Montana Indian situation is not 
entirely bleak, as illustrated by the Fort Peck and Flathead 
reservations. For example, the Fort Peck tribes, with their 
successful 500-employee tribal manufacturing plant at 
Poplar, have kept unemployment levels under 50 percent. Like 
the Flathead, they have become a role model among Indian 
reservations by implementing strong planning efforts, 
maintaining relative political stability and a commitment to 
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education. 
Together, Fort Peck's Assiniboine and Sioux and the 
Flathead's Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes are this 
state's most successful Indians. While this report clearly 
sets them above the others, it recognizes that what may be 
right for one reservation could prove fatal for another. 
This report offers no single, grand solution to the "Indian 
problem." Yet it is hoped that these two reservations — and 
particularly the Flathead — can serve as examples not only 
to other Montana Indians but to Montana's non-Indians, many 
of whom could learn and benefit from a closer relationship 
with this state's first residents. 
Despite cultural differences (see appendix), the 500 
miles between them, and their sharply contrasting land 
bases, the Indians of the Fort Peck and Flathead 
reservations share certain things in common. Both 
reservations are inhabited by more than one tribe. Both 
reservations have shown that, despite tribal differences, 
their members have been able to work together toward common 
goals. Both reservations are close to regional centers. Fort 
Peck is surrounded by towns like Glasgow, Wolf Point, 
Poplar, Scobey and Plentywood, and Williston, North Dakota 
is not far away. The Flathead' Reservation is situated 
between Missoula and Kalispell, and Poison is on the 
reservation. 
One can't help but notice something else: that these 
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reservations are the two most heavily influenced by whites. 
They are the only two Montana reservations where Indians 
have become minorities. 
The interaction between whites and Indians on these 
two reservations has benefited the Indians. These two tribal 
governments have a long history of dealing with the dominant 
white society close-up. They seem to mesh more easily with 
local, state, and federal governments. For instance, it 
seems significant that Flathead and Fort Peck tribal leaders 
expressed the fewest complaints regarding the BIA, while 
tribal leaders on other reservations spoke of poor to 
terrible relations with the BIA. 
However, if interaction with whites has been a 
significant reason for these reservations' successful 
economies and governments, that success has come at a cost. 
The Flathead reservation, the primary focus of this report, 
provides the best example. For while the Flathead 
reservation has perhaps gained the most of all Montana 
reservations, both economically and politically, from living 
with whites, the Confederated Salish and Kootenai as a 
people have also paid the highest price for their success. 
The first and most significant cost incurred by the 
Salish and Kootenai was the loss of their lands due to turn-
of-the-century allotment policies. Nationwide, Indian lands 
were reduced from about 156 million acres in 1881 to 47 
million acres by 1933, when allotment policies were 
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curtailed. On the Flathead, current tribal or individual 
Indian holdings total about about 50 percent of the total 
1.2 million reservation acres. 
The economic costs of allotment policies can be 
measured by comparing economic statistics of Indians to 
whites who live on the same reservation. On the Flathead, 
Indian unemployment of about 27 percent is two to three 
times that of non-Indians. And in just about all other 
socio-economic categories — annual earnings, poverty, 
education, health — Salish and Kootenai tribal members come 
up short compared to their white neighbors. 
The cultural effects of living closely with whites 
have also been significant. The Salish and Kootenai have 
experienced a significant dilution of their Indian blood, 
perhaps the most of all Montana tribes. Inter-racial 
marriages have created families where some children are 
tribal members and others are not. Tribal leaders report a 
near loss of native language and culture — in essense, 
ethnic identity. 
But, to the credit of current Salish and Kootenai 
tribal leadership, the Indians of the Flathead are not 
looking back. While recognizing the importance of Native 
history and culture, they seem to recognize that it will do 
them no good to speak their language if in the end they lose 
control of their reservation in court, where the Indian 
battles of today are fought in English. 
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Times have changed. Resources are getting scarce. 
And Indians, if they want to survive, will have to show that 
they can function in a modern world. That means they must 
establish governments that can deal effectively and 
professionally with local, state, and federal jurisdictions. 
It means they must risk interaction with the outside world. 
It means that Indian education, whether in Indian-run or 
state-run schools, must be culturally sensitive to the needs 
of Indian youths. The question remains whether Montana's 
Indians can figure how to have it all: political self-
determination, economic self-sufficiency, the ability to 
mesh with the dominant white society, yet at the same time 
retain their unique cultural identity. 
From an economic perspective, the Salish and 
Kootenai are pursuing three important conditions for 
development: control, capital, and management. Their present 
policies seek to get control of resources, raise capital by 
making deals with outside organizations or agencies, and 
provide for tribal management of resources once control is 
gained. These three concepts are linked. With no capital, 
it's tough to gain control of resources. Without control of 
resources, management becomes a moot point. On the Flathead, 
capital is no longer in short supply due to the Kerr Dam 
agreement, and tribal government has the financial ability 
to move ahead in efforts to gain control of resources and 
begin managing them. 
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Clearly, the Salish and Kootenai are off to a good, 
albeit late, start in their drive for self determination. 
They've shown with their Kerr Dam settlement that Indians 
can make lucrative, long-term deals with non-Indian 
interests on their own behalf. They've shown with their 
Shoreline Protection Office and Wildland Recreation 
Department that they can manage popular recreational 
resources that are used primarly by non-Indians. They've 
shown by creating racially mixed advisory boards that they 
are willing to be good neighbors, but at the same time, 
they've shown that Montanans can expect them to assert what 
they believe are their treaty rights. 
Salish and Kootenai Tribes' motivation is obvious: 
survival — political, economic, and cultural. While tribal 
leaders can accurately and honestly speak of spiritual ties 
to the land, they also recognize that Indians have become a 
significant minority on their own reservation, and that 
environmental regulations, by limiting population growth on 
the reservation, can be the means to the ends which they 
seek. 
Whites outnumber Indians on the reservation by a 
ratio of about four to one. The last thing the Salish and 
Kootenai need is an oil boom, a manufacturing plant, or a 
pulp mill, each with the capacity to bring several hundred 
white workers and their families to the reservation. Should 
the Flatheads become more outnumbered by whites than they 
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are now, the result could be their ultimate defeat. Clearly, 
what's needed, from the tribes' perspective, are minimum-
impact, clean industries like tourism and recreation, or the 
tribally owned electronics manufacturing plant. 
Tribal policies that limit growth may appear to many 
— both Indians and non-Indians — to run against the best 
interest of all who live in the Flathead Valley, where jobs 
are at a premium. Perhaps these critics are right, but if 
so, they are looking at the issue from a short-term 
perspective. 
Current tribal policy looks beyond the immediate 
five years and on into the next century. Tribal leaders have 
a long-term perspective that seems to buck the convential 
wisdom of the benefits of growth for growth's sake. 
In doing so, the Salish and Kootenai are confirming 
their place in Montana and the world, as well as making a 
special promise to Montanans and others who will have the 
opportunity to visit their land. With each of their new 
resource management ordinances, together with their overall 
philosophy of controlled economic development, the Salish 
and Kootenai have said they will protect and enhance the 
environment of their reservation. They're betting that these 
policies will preserve their land and culture and, in the 
process, provide long-term economic stability. 
The Salish and Kootenai have chosen a path that will 
likely prohibit resource exploitation or industrial growth 
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in favor of a cource of action that is based on a philosophy 
which puts environmental protection and regulation at the 
foundation of economic development policy. Only time will 
tell whether their approach is right. Certainly, as the 
Flathead Indian Reservation moves into the next century, it 
will provide an excellent case study in Indian policy, self-
determination, and economic development. 
More important to watch, though, is the immediate 
and growing role the Salish and Kootenai play in shaping 
economic, environmental, and political actions in western 
Montana. The Salish and Kootenai can, in certain arenas, 
pack an environmental punch unmatched elsewhere in western 
Montana. Their treaty with the federal government ensures 
them control over many of the reservation's natural 
resources. They own about 600,000 acres of the Misson 
Valley, including 300,000 acres of commercial forest and 
90,000 acres of wilderness. They own the bed and banks of 
the southern portion of Flathead Lake. They have exclusive 
rights to fish and wildlife. 
If tribal actions taken in 1986 and 1987 are either 
left unchallenged or are ultimately upheld by courts, the 
Salish and Kootenai will control all wetlands, streambeds, 
and riverbanks within the reservation, regardless of 
ownership. They will require minimum stream-flows for fish 
and other aquatic animals. They will manage the local power 
cooperative. They will manage fish and game. If the Salish 
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and Kootenai maintain their momentum, the future will see 
even more Indian control on the reservation. Already Indian 
leaders are talking about reservation-wide land-use planning 
and zoning. 
What the Salish and Kootenai do with their resources 
will shape the future of not only their reservation, but the 
entire Flathead Valley, and, to some degree, the state of 
Montana. Given the necessity for the tribes' environmental 
ethic and the potential strength of that ethic, the winner 
could be the land itself, which in turn provides the basis 
for long term economic stability and a tribal conservation 
strategy of sustained development. 
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APPENDIX 
Profile of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation 
The People; The Blackfeet Indian descended from three 
tribes of northern Great Plains: the North Peigans, 
the "Blackfeet" (South Peigans), and the "Kainai" 
or Bloods. All three spoke a common language. In the 
1700s, the Blackfeet Nation numbered more than 
15,000 and lived on both sides of what was to become 
the Canada-United States border. They were the 
largest and most dominant tribes in Montana, but 
wars and diseases (smallpox, for example) that 
followed the white man West diminished Blackfeet 
population to about 2,000 by 1885. Montana's 
Blackfeet still retain ties with relatives who 
live in Canada. 
The Land: The reservation encircles 1.5 million acres just 
west of Glacier National Park. The first treaties 
with the Blackfeet were in the mid-1800s and 
recognized more than half of Montana as Blackfeet 
territory. Most of this land was subsequently 
taken away from the Blackfeet, often with no 
compensation. Tribal boundaries in the late 1800s 
included the eastern portion of what is now Glacier 
National Park as well as the the unit of land called 
Badger-Two Medicine. The Dawes Act of 1887 was 
applied to the reservation in 1907. Each Indian 
was alloted 320 acres. Remaining land was opened 
to white settlement. 
Portion Owned by Tribe or Individual Indians: about 
61 percent. 
Tribal Membership: about 12,700. 
Resident Blackfeet Population: about 5,525. 
Total Reservation Population: about 6,660. 
Whites on Reservation: 1,135. 
Tribal Unemployment Rate: 36 percent (BIA 1985); 
tribal government reported 80 percent in 1986. 
Blackfeet Living in Poverty: 39 percent (1980 Census); tribe 
reported 60 percent in 1986. 
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Approximate Tribal Revenue: $6 million (1985), about 
60 percent coming from oil and gas revenues. Falling 
energy prices were expected to reduce tribal 
revenue by more than $2 million in 1986. 
* * * 
Profile of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation 
The People: Fort Peck Indian Reservation is home to two 
tribes, Assiniboine and Sioux. The Assiniboine of 
Fort Peck are related to the Assiniboine of Fort 
Belknap Reservation. Both were once part of the same 
tribe, but from different bands, and have called 
northern Montana home for 200 years. Fort Peck's 
Sioux descended from people who were forced from 
homelands in Minnesota in the 1850s. They moved 
west to the Dakotas and eastern Montana. Together 
with the Northern Cheyenne, the Sioux defeated Gen. 
George Custer at the Battle of the Little Big Horn 
in 1876. After the fight, some Sioux began settling 
in the Fort Peck area. Treaties with the Assiniboine 
and Sioux, setting up the reservation as it is known 
today, were signed in 1886. 
The Land: The Fort Peck Reservation was once part of a large 
common hunting ground shared by several tribes, 
including the Assiniboine. Congressional action in 
1888 established the present reservation boundaries, 
encompassing about 2.1 million acres of rolling 
prairie north of the Missouri River between 
Porcupine and Muddy creeks. The reservation was 
opened for white settlement in 1908. 
Portion Owned by Tribes or Individual Indians: 
about 45 percent. 
Tribal Membership: about 8,500. 
Resident Assiniboine and Sioux: about 4,500. 
Total Reservation Population: about 10,000. 
Number of Whites Living on Reservation: about 5,500. 
Tribal Unemployment Rate: about 40 percent (BIA 1985); 
tribal government reports same for 1986. 
Percentage of Assiniboine and Sioux Living in Poverty: 
42 percent (1980 Census); tribe reports 35 percent 
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in 1986. 
Tribal Budget; Tribal revenue figures were not made 
available. However, the tribal budget for 1986 was 
estimated at between $2 million and $3 million, a 
drop of about $2 million from 1985. 
* * * 
Profile of the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation 
The People: The Assiniboine (Stone Cook) and Gros Ventre 
(Big Belly) tribes, once enemies, share the Fort 
Belknap Reservation. They were given their names by 
early French explorers. The Assinboine prefer 
"Nakota," meaning "the people," while the Gros 
Ventre prefer "A'aninin" meaning "white clay 
people." Both moved independently onto the plains 
from the Great Lakes region more than two 
centuries ago. 
The Land: Both tribes once shared the huge common hunting 
grounds which encompassed half of Montana. 
Today, the reservation covers 653,938 acres of 
mostly dry farm and range land south of the Milk 
River to the Little Rocky Mountains, which, until 
gold was discovered, were part of the reservation. 
Portion Owned by Tribes or Individual Indians: 95 percent. 
Tribal Membership: About 4,200. 
Total Reservation Population: about 2,100. 
Total Indian Population: about 1,900. Four neighboring 
towns — Harlem, Dodson, Malta and Chinook — are 
home to about 400 more tribal members. 
Number of Whites Living on Reservation: about 200. 
Tribal Unemployment Rate: about 78 percent (BIA, 1985); 
tribal government reports same in 1986. 
Percentage of Assiniboine and Sioux Living in Poverty: 
47 percent (1980 Census); tribes report 66 percent 
in 1986. 
Approximate Tribal Revenue, 1985: about $500,000, 
mostly from land leases. 
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Profile of the Rocky Boy's Indian Reservation 
The People: The Chippewa-Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy's 
Reservation are descendents of two tribes with roots 
in the Great Lakes region. They found themselves 
displaced and homeless in Montana before the turn 
of the century. Little Bear, chief of the Cree band, 
and Stone Child, chief of the Chippewa band, joined 
forces in seeking a reservation for their people. 
They succeeded in 1916, when the reservation was 
established by executive order. The reservation is 
named in honor of Stone Child, who name was 
erroneously translated by whites into Rocky Boy. 
The Land: By far the smallest Montana Indian Reservation, it 
extends from the Bear Paw Mountains northwest onto 
the plains near Havre. The original reservation was 
55,000 acres of the old Fort Assiniboine Military 
Reservation. Subsequent additions doubled the size 
of the reservation to today's 108,000 acres. 
Portion Owned by the Tribe or Individual Indians: Virtually 
all of it, since it was never opened to white 
settlement under the Dawes Act. 
Tribal Membership: about 3,300. 
Resident Chippewa-Cree Population: about 2,000. 
Total Reservation Population: about 2,170. 
Number of Whites Living on Reservation: Very few. 
Tribal Unemployment Rate: 70 percent (BIA 1985); tribal 
government reports 85 percent in 1986. 
Percent of Chippewa-Cree Living in Poverty: 
40 percent (1980 Census); tribe reports more than 
50 percent in 1986. 
Approximate Tribal Revenue, 1985: about $300,000, mostly 
from land leases and oil and gas revenues. With 
energy market down, 1986 revenue was expected 
to be about $200,000. 
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Profile of the Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation 
The People: The Northern Cheyenne call themselves the 
"Morning Star People" in honor of Chief Dull Knife, 
also known as Morning Star. Like many of the Plains 
tribes, the Cheyenne are believed to have originally 
lived in the Great Lakes region and subsequently 
moved west. The Cheyenne were living in the Black 
Hills when encountered by Lewis and Clark in 1804, 
and are believed to have moved to Montana 20 or 30 
years later. They split into northern and southern 
groups, with the larger tribe moving south. Together 
with the Sioux, the Northern Cheyenne defeated 
Custer at the Battle of the Little Big Horn in 1876. 
After unsuccessfully trying to force the Northern 
Cheyenne to live with their distant relatives the 
Southern Cheyenne in Oklahoma, a reservation along 
Montana's Tongue River was established in 1884. It 
was enlarged to its present size in 1900. 
The Land: 444,157 acres of range and forest lands just east 
of the Crow Indian Reservation in southeast Montana. 
Portion Owned by Tribe or Individual Indians: 
about 98 percent. 
Tribal Membership: about 3,600. 
Resident Cheyenne Population: about 3,100. 
Total Reservation Population: about 3,600. 
Number of Whites Living on the Reservation: about 500. 
Tribal Unemployment Rate: 60 percent (BIA 1985). 
Percentage of Cheyenne Living in Poverty: 45 percent (1980 
Census); tribe reports over 50 percent in 1986. 
* * * 
Profile of the Crow Indian Reservation 
The People: The Crows' roots are in the Great Lakes region. 
They are believed to have arrived in Montana around 
1600. Trading began with whites in the early 1800s. 
A treaty of friendship was signed between the tribe 
and the federal government in 1825. Relations 
between the government and Crows have historically 
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been good. In fact, Crow scouts aided the U.S. 
Cavalry in several regional battles, including the 
infamous Battle of Little Big Horn. 
The Land: The Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851 established a 
reservation of more than 37 million acres in 
southeastern Montana and northeastern Wyoming. 
Subsequent treaties reduced the reservation to 
its present size of 2.2 million acres. 
Allotment opened the reservation to white 
settlement, further reducing Indian holdings. 
Nevertheless, it remains Montana's largest 
Indian reservation. 
Portion owned by Tribe or Individual Indians: 
about 78 percent. The tribe retains mineral rights 
to 1.1 million acres of coal-rich rangeland just 
north of the reservation. 
Resident Crow Population: about 4,000. 
Tribal Membership: about 7,000. 
Total Reservation Population: about 6,000. 
Number of Whites Living on Reservation: about 2,000. 
Tribal Unemployment Rate: 57 percent (BIA 1985); 
tribal government reported 85 percent in 1986. 
Percentage of Crow Living in Poverty: 34 percent 
(1980 Census); tribe reported 97 percent of all 
households received some form of welfare in 1986. 
• • • 
Profile of the Flathead Indian Reservation 
The People: The Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes are 
descendents of several tribes, including the Pend 
d'Oreille, Kalispel, Spokane, Salish, and Kootenai. 
Unlike Montana's other tribes, with historic roots 
in the upper Midwest or Canada, the Flatheads' 
roots are in the Pacific Coast region. They are 
believed to be the state's first residents, having 
moved to the valleys of western Montana perhaps 
as long ago as 5,000 B.C. 
The Land: The Treaty of Hell Gate in 1855 established a 
reservation that encompassed the Bitterroot and 
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Flathead valleys. In 1872, Indians living in the 
Bitterroot were ordered to the Flathead Valley. A 
band of hold-outs were forced within the 
reservation's present boundaries about 20 years 
later. Today, the reservation covers about 
1.2 million acres of the Lower Flathead Valley, 
including the southern half of Flathead Lake 
and the western side of the Mission Mountains. 
Portion Owned by Tribes or Individual Indians: 
about 50 percent. 
Tribal Membership: about 6,200. 
Number of Flatheads Living on Reservation: about 3,800. 
Total Reservation Population: about 19,600. 
Number of Whites Living on Reservation: about 15,800. 
Tribal Unemployment: 27 percent (BIA 1985). 
Percentage of Flathead Indians Living in Poverty: 
35 percent (1980 Census). 
Estimated Tribal Revenue, 1985: $12.5 million, of which 
$9 million came from Montana Power Co.'s rent 
payment for Kerr Dam. 
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